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ABSTRACT 
EFFECTS OF UNITED STATES DOMESTIC AGRICULTURAL  
GRAIN SUBSIDIES ON MEXICAN MIGRANT FLOWS  
by Pat Robert O’Brien 
May 2013 
United States national, domestic feed grain subsidies have little effect on rural 
Mexican migration to the United States. This research shows the effect of the United 
States domestic feed grain subsidies on unbalanced trade with Mexico, the effect of 
unbalanced feed grain trade on poverty in rural Mexico, and the effect of Mexican rural 
poverty on Mexican migration to the United States. 
The United States domestic agricultural infrastructure, including the United States 
General Services Support Estimate of subsidies, predict increased exports of corn to 
Mexico, but producer support subsidies to United States farmers do not. 
Mexican estimates of poverty are based on the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y 
Geografia (ENIGH) data and do not support an adverse economic impact on rural Mexico 
as a result of this trade imbalance with the United States. During the period studied the 
rates of rural Mexican poverty decreased.   
Although Mexican migration to the United States has consistently increased, the 
rate is not shown to be predicted by lower economic conditions of the Mexican rural 
poor.  Thus the potential causality of United States national, domestic feed grain 
subsidies on rural Mexican migration to the United States is not supported by the data. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This research investigates the impact of national, domestic feed grain producer 
subsidies in the United States on rural Mexican emigration flows, including those into the 
United States, and summarizes the subsequent coping strategies of individuals, formal 
non-governmental and governmental sectors. It answers the questions what, if any, and 
how strong are the stimulus effects of imported subsidized feed grains on the emigration 
of the Mexican rural poor. 
This research first establishes the extent to which United States domestic 
agricultural subsidies result in an unbalanced trade advantage of feed grain exports with 
Mexico under the rules of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). There 
has been concern about the expected effects of United States domestic agricultural 
subsidy policy on rural Mexico, even prior to the scheduled January 2008 elimination of 
the remaining agricultural tariffs on corn and other products (Burstein 2007). Second, this 
research documents the extent of the economic impact on rural Mexico and the resulting 
displacement of agricultural workers from farms as a result of this trade imbalance. 
Lastly, this research evaluates migration trends in Mexico, especially those of the 
agricultural population from 1990 to 2010. The discussion applies Kuznets’s (1955, 
1971) theory of phases of development and migration theory to explain migration from 
rural communities to Mexican semi-urban areas, larger urban population centers, and 
locations of opportunity in the United States. This research also documents variables that 
explain why, though there is significant emigration, the Mexican rural population as 
percent of the nation, 24%, is not expected to decrease significantly through 2030 
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(Fussell 2004). The survival mechanisms of the rural Mexican culture are discussed, 
including changes in sources of income and increasing dissemination of information that 
provides awareness of limited domestic opportunities and motivation to the rural 
Mexican population to emigrate. 
This paper shows the effect of the United States domestic feed grain subsidies on 
unbalanced trade, the effect of unbalanced trade on poverty in rural Mexico, and the 
effect of rural poverty on Mexican emigration. Distinctions between legal and illegal 
immigration are beyond the scope of this study. This study is to provide policy insight to 
factors which affect United States immigration that may otherwise have been overlooked 
in public policy development. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE EFFECT OF U.S. DOMESTIC FARM SUBSIDIES ON  
UNBALANCED FEED GRAIN TRADE WITH MEXICO 
Introduction 
From the early nineteenth century the populations of Central and South America 
have been engaged in a struggle against the more organized and intentional trade 
complex of the European continent and its children (Bulmer-Thomas 2003). The 
organizational infrastructure of industrialized countries is so ubiquitous it overwhelms 
competition in lesser developed countries, often ignorantly, as different sectors struggle 
in competitive environments. 
Review of the Literature 
Theoretical Background 
Bhagwati (1990) provides insights into national motivations of competition in 
international trade by discussing a reciprocity that applies to all other nations and a 
reciprocity that applies to only a few. The first he identifies as non-discriminating 
multilateralism and the second as discriminating multilateralism, found in preferential 
trade agreements. He is especially concerned about the implementation of the “aggressive 
unilateralism” of strong economies against weaker competitors. Bhagwati (1994, 231) 
subsequently revisits whether free trade is a desirable objective of national policy. He 
notes that in addition to the factor market imperfections discussed by Smith, Mill, and 
Ricardo, product market imperfections are being emphasized in recent trade theory 
discussions. Developed countries fear that developing countries will use free trade to 
drive down the wages of unskilled labor, and developing countries fear a loss of level 
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playing fields with free trade. Trefler (2004) places these issues in a temporal 
perspective, showing the conflict over implementation of free trade between displaced 
workers and stakeholders of closed plants who bear short-run adjustment costs and 
stakeholders of competitive plants and users of final and intermediate goods who reap 
long-run efficiency gains.  
Despite established theory of the welfare improving value of free trade, it is not 
universally accepted. Bhagwati (1994) observes the development of successive General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) round negotiations, which allows less 
developed nations restrictions of free trade, especially in factor markets that attest to the 
practice and belief in restricted trade. As developing countries implement protectionist 
practices developed countries implement non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in an attempt to 
balance the trade restrictions allowed in GATT for developing nations. Developing 
countries have a growing fear that as global trade increases unfair advantages will result 
in a permanent displacement of local skills. These fears challenge the theory of 
comparative advantage and result in vacillation of national outlook toward free trade, as 
seen in changes in public opinion about NAFTA in both the United States and Mexico 
during its tenure. Although the Factor Price Equalization and Stolper-Samuelson 
theorems (Stopler and Samuelson 1941) show the adverse impact of free trade on 
individual nations, Leontief (1953) demonstrates in his paradox that sometimes those 
factors that seem most scarce or overvalued compose a significant portion of a nation’s 
exports. Bhagwati (1994, 242) argues that free trade can overcome the scarce production 
factors argument of Stopler-Samuelson by increasing the individual and public wealth of 
trading nations, describing the effect as a “lifting-all-boats” of economies. This occurs as 
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competition and discipline increase the overall efficiency of industries in countries 
involved in free trade. 
Bhagwati, Greenaway, and Panagariya (1998) also compare regional trade groups 
to world-wide free trade under the World Trade Organization (WTO). These perspectives 
are important for Mexico, which implemented trade concessions to the United States and 
Canada in an attempt to gain market access, beginning with the Mexican National 
Development Plan implemented by President Carlos Salinas de Gortari in 1989. These 
same markets were subsequently open to significant competition from Asia and 
especially from the People’s Republic of China in 2001, under very similar terms. Viner 
(1950) distinguishes between trade diversion and extension. Expected trade diversions of 
United States imports from Mexico under NAFTA were mitigated when China became a 
member of the WTO. The United States, however, remains Mexico’s largest trading 
partner, and although Mexico does not possess labor cost advantages over the People’s 
Republic of China, it does have a seven year head start in a trade treaty with the United 
States as a result of structural links dating from the mid-1960s in the Maquiladora and 
automobile manufacturing industries, and complementary borders providing appreciably 
lower transportation costs to Mexican exporters to the United States. Bhagwati notes that 
in addition to these advantages, “actual trade diversion . . . reflect[s] the underlying 
fundamentals [of] elasticities of substitution among products” (Bhagwati et al. 1998, 
1132) and so enhances trade within NAFTA. There are costs of trade within a free trade 
agreement. Bhagwati describes the difficulty of implementing a fair trade agreement 
tariff policy with multiple component parts and levels of production among many 
countries and regions as a “spaghetti bowl” (Bhagwati et al. 1998, 1138), with multiple 
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trade authorities implementing different domains within international trade agreements. 
Sawyer (2001) notes that there are significant compliance costs of obtaining duty free 
benefits of NAFTA and that some potential participants in this free trade regime may opt 
out as results of those costs. Krishna (1998) concludes that participation in preferential 
trading arrangements in NAFTA is driven by lobbying of concentrated interest groups 
and diverts trade from a multinational context to one among trading partners. 
Krueger (1999) compares national protectionist policies, in the context of 
preferential trading arrangements (PTAs), to multilateral trade arrangements. The 
Uruguay Round allows PTAs under certain restrictions. Both Krueger (1999) and 
Nguyen, Perroni, and Wigle (1993) agree that the Uruguay Round does not 
comprehensively address tariff and non-tariff trade barriers on agriculture. As noted 
earlier, PTAs are often borne out of political pressures, and while the formation of the 
Canada-United States Free Agreement (CUSFTA) occurred without fanfare, the political 
rhetoric “attracted by Mexican accession was entirely disproportionate to the economic 
magnitude of the event” (Krueger 1999, 108). Trade between Mexico and the United 
States grew significantly following the implementation of NAFTA. Krueger (1999, 113) 
notes that within the context of PTAs, “Little has been done analytically or empirically to 
evaluate the efficiency costs of having different areas of an FTA confronted by different 
prices of intermediate products.” Krueger also notes the importance of the proximity of 
trading partners. A situation of comparative advantage of the United States and Canada 
with Mexico does exist and can be exploited to increase the welfare of all NAFTA 
members. The free tariff environment within NAFTA does have a magnetic effect on 
footloose industries which may choose to relocate in Mexico from non-NAFTA 
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locations. Krueger (1999) discusses national protectionist’s motivations for adopting a 
PTA such as keeping non-member countries out, but does not address how a principal 
member of a PTA, such as the United States can abuse that agreement against a weaker 
economic power, such as Mexico. Krueger, more tolerant of allowing PTAs than 
Bhagwati, expresses concern that most of the research on the effects of NAFTA has been 
done within the context of a computable general equilibrium. Though Kruger sees some 
aspects in which PTAs are “stepping-stones” to freer trade (Kruger 1999, 122), Bhagwati 
sees them as “stumbling blocks” to international free trade (Kruger 1999, 122). 
Krugman and Venables (1995) contend that within international trade 
arrangements transportation costs affect the real income of the nations involved. They 
demonstrate that as transportation costs fall below a critical value, a core-periphery of 
developing nations interacting with a central more economically developed nation 
spontaneously forms. When this occurs, developing peripheral nations suffer a decline in 
real income. They also note that if these transportation costs continue to decrease there is 
eventually a convergence of real incomes among the nations involved.  
Hufbauer and Schott (2008) describe the trade regime under NAFTA as 
successful, tripling trade between the three nations to $900 billion. There are some losers. 
Jobs were lost, wages were depressed in some sectors, and emigration from Mexico was 
not adequately addressed. They cite that causes of failure subsequent to NAFTA involved 
Mexican governmental failure to deliver tax and energy reforms, failure to fund 
education infrastructure in Mexico, and failure of the National Mexican government to 
eradicate corruption. They encourage a commitment by the Mexican National 
government to provide training and opportunity for displaced Mexican labor. The United 
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States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, NAFTA at 13: 
Implementation Nears Completion (2007) notes that the longest tariff transition period of 
NAFTA, fourteen years, was extended to corn as a major component of the rural 
agricultural sector economy to allow time for labor and industry adjustment to changes 
brought about by NAFTA.  
Concern from Mexico 
The conference and Working Group on U.S.-Mexico Agricultural Issues, 
documented by Burstein (2007), convened by the Woodrow Wilson Center and 
Fundacion IDEA in April 2007, provides preliminary discussion into the expected effects 
of United States domestic agricultural subsidy policy on rural Mexico with the scheduled 
January 2008 elimination of the remaining agricultural tariffs on corn, beans, sugar, and 
other products. The World Bank’s World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for 
Development (2007) examines agriculture as a tool for development and provides a guide 
to unanswered issues of this subsidy-induced trade imbalance, including the negative 
economic impact on rural Mexico and the displacement of agricultural workers from 
farms.  
Napoles (2007) observes that the evidence of Mexico’s welfare following the 
implementation of free trade regimes is mixed. Carlsen (2008) notes that many in Mexico 
fear that the implementation of the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) and Plan 
Mexico, virtual extensions of NAFTA, were motivated by and resulted in political 
control, not the economic welfare of Mexican citizens. 
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Activities in and Explanation from the United States 
The profit motive for organizations in a perfectly competitive market, such as 
agriculture, is limited to cost reduction of production efforts. The United States 
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Feed Grains Backgrounder 
(2007) documents government support programs that provide sources of funding that 
reduce cost outlay and enhance productive facilities. Safety net programs, income 
support, and crop and revenue insurance have provided direct support to feed grain 
operators. Other programs of environmental stewardship and demand enhancement 
policies, such as those that incentivize ethanol production, provide indirect support. 
These policies have impacted feed grain production through acreage reduction programs 
(ARP), the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), and planting provisions under 
successive farm legislation. The United States Department of Agriculture, Economic 
Research Service, Feed Grains Backgrounder (2007) notes that the United States 
domestic corn production is increasing and other feed grains are diminishing as subsidies 
and incentives for corn continue to increase. Government payments account for as much 
as 8 percent of average gross cash income for feed grain farms. The United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) 
data for 2003 show that 70 percent of feed grain farms cover cash expenses from gross 
cash income. Without government payments, 8 percent fewer feed grain farms would 
cover their cash costs. The United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research 
Service, Feed Grains Backgrounder (2007) notes that in addition to government 
subsidies, a complete supporting feed grain infrastructure has developed with formal 
markets and organizations such as the USDA’s Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards 
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Administration (GIPSA), which provides standards for product evaluation and more 
efficient capital markets.  
In addition to sector survival subsidies, trade-related programs for feed grain 
producers lower costs and increase profitability of feed grains exported. The United 
States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service and the United States 
Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service list United States government 
trade-related programs, which include export Credit Guarantee programs, help finance 
commercial exports of United States agricultural products, and the Market Access 
Program (MAP), which develops, maintains, and expands United States agricultural 
exports. The USDA, FAS also documents food aid in the form of direct donations and 
concessional programs. These programs provide direct United States government 
purchases, which result in increasing product demand and, subsequently, prices. They 
include the Food for Peace, Food for Progress Act, and the McGovern-Dole International 
Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program, paying for United States commodities 
donated to developing countries and emerging democracies. 
There are some international trade conflicts with United States subsidies. The 
United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Feed Grains 
Backgrounder (2007) notes that while the United States government supports its 
domestic feed grain sector, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is concerned with 
market access, domestic support issues, and renewable energy policy. Blonigen (2006) 
contends that the United States dumping margins rose significantly from 1980 to 2000, 
attributing much of this increase to the discretionary practices of the United States 
Department of Commerce. Knox (2006) notes that of the four dispute resolution 
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mechanisms outlined in the NAFTA, the most active is NAFTA Chapter 19 Antidumping 
(AD) and countervailing duties (CVD). Schnepf (2010) documents the 2002 Farm Act 
challenged during the United States WTO cotton case and that the WTO panel ruled that 
United States direct payments for cotton did not meet the definition of decoupled 
payments as specified by the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), which 
deemed that there be no restrictions on the choice of crops grown by the producer. 
Bhagwati and Mavroidis (2004) document the reaction of the WTO Appellate Body 
against the antidumping provision of the Byrd Amendment, officially known as the 
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (CDSOA), because it was not 
included in the three forms of duties noted in the WTO Antidumping Agreement. 
Bhagwati and Mavroidis also contend that substantively the Byrd Amendment violated 
the WTO Antidumping Agreement because, “by over-compensating (allegedly) injured 
private parties, the United States turns the tables and disturbs the ‘level playing field,’ 
this time to the advantage of its nationals” (Bhagwati and Mavroidis 2004, 120)  The 
United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Feed Grains 
Backgrounder (2007) also notes that the international emphasis on conservation and 
environmental programs may allow continued direct payments within the United States; 
considered “green box” by the WTO (2007, 39). The Hong Kong Ministerial Agreement 
in December 2005 called for reductions in trade-distorting domestic support, elimination 
of export subsidies, and increased market access. The United States has agreed to limit 
trade-distorting domestic support, and this is expected to affect feed grain producer loan 
benefits and crop insurance subsidies, but the United States is concerned about equitable 
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treatment in market access, domestic support, export subsidies, and technical barriers to 
trade. 
The United States implements five interconnected national food aid programs 
under the direction of the United Stated Department of Agriculture and United States 
Agency for International Development, which purchase agriculture products from 
producers in the United States. They include the Food for Progress Program, the 
McGovern–Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program, the Food 
for Peace Act (formerly referred to as Public Law 480, Titles I, II, and III), Section 
416(b), and the Local and Regional Procurement Project (USDA, Foreign Agricultural 
Service, Food Aid). These food stocks are obtained through a national agricultural 
repository of commodities known as the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust, named in 
honor of the late Representative Bill Emerson of Missouri who served as ranking member 
of the House Select Committee on Hunger (Hanrahan 2003). These purchases from 
United States producers represent a significant guarantee/subsidy to these producers. 
John Hays describes price supports as “the last bastion of United States and 
European protectionism” (2011, ii). He includes food aid as an export subsidy and posits 
that “dumping of agricultural products on the markets of less developed countries, at 
prices lower than these products can be locally grown, is detrimental to the farmers of 
these nations” (Hays 2011, 261). Hays wonders under which conditions it would be better 
for these countries if the aid was in cash instead of agricultural products. 
Dual Agricultural Systems 
Addressing the effects of agricultural grain subsidies requires review of the 
respective agricultural systems of the countries considered. The agricultural system of 
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Mexico is defined by its production capabilities, consumption practices, and the 
transformational changes resulting from international pressures. The United States and 
Mexico have different agricultural systems and these differences influence trade 
balances. The United States focuses primarily on feed grain for animal production with 
predominately yellow dent corn. Mexico focuses its corn production efforts primarily 
toward consumer foods made from white corn (United States Department of Agriculture, 
Economic Research Service, U.S.-Mexico Corn Trade during the NAFTA Era: New 
Twists to an Old Story 2004). On average, the United States produced 14.5 times the total 
annual production tonnage of corn for 2007 through 2010 of Mexico. While the United 
States produces 15.4 percent more total annual tonnage than it consumes during this 
period, Mexico runs a 38.9 percent average total annual deficit, consuming more than it 
produces (United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, 2012. 
Table 5: World Corn Production, Consumption, and Stocks).  
Corn is grown in all of the states of Mexico. Between 1999 and 2010 an average 
of 39 percent of the total cultivated area in Mexico was devoted to corn production 
(Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación, Servicio 
de Información y Estadística Agroalimentaria Pesquera (SAGARPA/SIAP Statistics of 
Agricultural Production by Crop). 2011 Agricultural Yearbook 2011). Seventy percent of 
Mexican corn production, however, is from eight states: Chiapas, Guerrero, Jalisco, 
Mexico, Michoacán, Puebla, Sinaloa, and Veracruz (Mejia and Peel 2009a).  
The Mexican agricultural system is composed of large commercial, medium 
communal (ejidos), small and very small subsistence farms. Farming systems also vary in 
farming practice, whether they irrigate or use dry land farming techniques (rain fed). 
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Although much of the corn farming in the United States is without irrigation, the corn 
producing regions in the United States experience significantly more and consistent 
rainfall than most of the farming regions of Mexico, which tend to be semi-arid (Mejia 
and Peel 2009b). Klepeis and Vance (2003) note more successful farms in terms of 
efficiency and total production are located where irrigation is used. The United States 
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Mexico Corn Trade during 
the NAFTA Era: New Twists to an Old Story (2004) notes only 9 percent of Mexican 
farmers have access to irrigation. Between 1999 and 2010 an average of 26.14 percent of 
the total cultivated area in Mexico receives irrigation (Secretaría de Agricultura, 
Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación, Servicio de Información y 
Estadística Agroalimentaria Pesquera (SAGARPA/SIAP Statistics of Agricultural 
Production by Crop). 2011 Agricultural Yearbook 2011). Larger Mexican farms tend to 
rely on technology inputs such as hybrid seed corn, fertilizer, and herbicides (Vilas-Ghiso 
and Liverman 2007), while smaller and subsistence farms rely on manure for fertilizer, 
original landrace seeds, and manual cultivation to eliminate weeds (Keleman 2010). 
Large Mexican farms employing advanced growing techniques with costly inputs reap 
higher yields, and smaller farms with limited inputs produce at a much lower cost, but 
reap significantly lower yields (Mejia and Peel 2009a). The United States Department of 
Agriculture, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Mexico Corn Trade during the NAFTA 
Era: New Twists to an Old Story also notes that only 31 percent of Mexican farms use 
“improved varieties of corn” (2004, 5).  United States farms are increasingly monoculture 
growth systems and rely almost exclusively on commercially provided seed and 
fertilizers (Hendrickson, James, and Heffernan 2008). Farmers in the United States are 
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increasingly leasing land to large farming operation companies, which subsequently 
control all phases of production (United States Department of Agriculture, Economic 
Research Service. Trends in U.S. Farmland Values and Ownership 2012). Mejia and Peel 
(2009a) note that large commercial and medium sized farms in Mexico grow both white 
and yellow corn and that yellow corn has higher yields. They also observe that “all 
[Mexican] states experience higher profits [using] commercial production [techniques in] 
growing both white and yellow corn” (Mejia and Peel 2009a, 17). Successful yellow corn 
production requires technology, improved seed varieties, fertilizer, pest agrochemicals, 
access to water, and management (Mejia and Peel 2009a). Between 1999 and 2010 an 
average of 3.4 percent of the total cultivated area in Mexico was devoted to yellow corn 
production, of this 40.4  percent was irrigated (SAGARPA 2011). Larger Mexican farm 
operations have access to finances and risk reduction strategies unavailable to smaller 
Mexican farms (United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 
U.S.-Mexico Corn Trade during the NAFTA Era: New Twists to an Old Story 2004). 
Crop rotation used in the United States to replenish soil nutrients and reduce soil erosion 
is somewhat impractical for small farms in Mexico. “Traditional corn producers in 
Mexico often do not have the management skills or the equipment necessary to capitalize 
on the yield and profit potential of yellow corn” (Mejia and Peel 2009b, 4). Smaller 
producers in arid and in high altitudes with harsher and more variable environments, 
however, use locally adapted seeds and farming techniques (Mejia and Peel 2009b).  
Boland, Dhuyvetter, and Marshall (2002) observe that most Mexican corn is 
grown in regions remote from locations in which it is milled and consumed. It is 
harvested twice each year, consumed throughout the year, but storage facilities are 
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lacking in Mexico. Most United States farmers have access to product storage facilities. 
These storage facilities allow United States farmers to sell harvested corn at optimal 
prices and provide continuous delivery of product beyond harvest seasons. During 
periods of drought Mexican imports of corn increase. Mexico is also experiencing a 
growing livestock industry as the changing income elasticity of demand of consumers is 
resulting in more demand for meat and relatively less for grain foods. Livestock sector 
growth demands yellow corn for beef, poultry production, cereal, and beer since 1993 
have been increasing (United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research 
Service, U.S.-Mexico Corn Trade during the NAFTA Era: New Twists to an Old Story 
2004). 
Mexican corn production is inefficiently organized. Farm gate prices are low and 
intermediaries capture large profits (United States Department of Agriculture, Economic 
Research Service, U.S.-Mexico Corn Trade during the NAFTA Era: New Twists to an Old 
Story 2004). Market failures occur because of lack of technology, market intermediaries, 
corruption, low yield, and inefficiency in the marketing system and structural problems 
that prevent transition from subsistence to market based agricultural systems (United 
States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Mexico Corn Trade 
during the NAFTA Era: New Twists to an Old Story 2004). Yellow corn production in 
Mexico has increased from below 1 percent of total planted area in 2000 to 4.7 percent in 
2010 (SAGARPA 2011). Echánove and Steffen (2005) note restrictions ejidatarios 
(members of a communally owned farm) face with access to water for their crops. Cohen 
(2001, 957) notes “the Mexican government's agrarian policies that favored large-scale 
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irrigation projects over family farms (minifundios) producing largely for self-
consumption.”  
Mejia and Peel note that yellow corn is a good crop “alternative because of the 
higher profit potential” (2009b, 6) but yellow corn requires “adequate water and much of 
the yellow corn is grown on the limited amount of irrigated land available in Mexico 
(2009b, 7). “Much corn is grown in high altitudes or in other diverse climate conditions 
for which there is no locally adapted yellow corn varieties” (2009b, 7).  Boyd and 
Ibarraran (2008, 374) discuss the “increasing the intensity of extreme weather events.” 
Mexican domestic demand outpaces its supply. Consumption practices in Mexico 
are rooted in cultural heritage and national identity (Mejia and Peel 2009b) but are 
changing partially due to changing income elasticity and partially due to cultural 
influences of developed countries (Schmidhuber and Prakash 2005). Boland et al. (2002) 
note that uses for white corn include food-grade starch and paper, tortilla chips, and 
tortillas. Corn production in Mexico increases over the period studied, but consumer 
demand is increasing more rapidly. Mexico is the fourth largest producer and third largest 
consumer of corn in the world (USDA, FAS 2012). Mexico is increasingly dependent on 
imports. During1986–2007 Mexican corn production increased from 10.0 to 20.5 million 
metric tons (MMT) and corn imports increased from 1.7 to 9.8 MMT (USDA, ERS 
database 2011). 
The United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, U.S.-
Mexico Corn Trade during the NAFTA Era: New Twists to an Old Story (2004) notes that 
the Mexican starch industry consumes yellow corn imported from the United States, and 
large flour companies are increasing this role in tortilla production. United States yellow 
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corn exports to Mexico are increasingly used in animal feed but are also used to 
“manufacture ethanol, high-fructose corn syrup, corn starch and other products” (United 
States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Mexico Corn Trade 
during the NAFTA Era: New Twists to an Old Story 2004, 2). The report also suggests 
that yellow and white corns are interchangeable in some of these processes.  
Mejia and Peel (2009a) note that white and yellow corn began to be distinguished 
in the international trade data beginning in 2005. They also observe that yellow corn 
production in Mexico has become increasingly more attractive as domestic and world 
demand for yellow corn increase. Lower Mexican efficiency and production of yellow 
corn, however, result in Mexican food industries importing lower cost international corn 
rather than purchasing this commodity from domestic sources.  
Constance (2012) notes that although ethanol production in Mexico is still 
negligible, ethanol production may grow within the Mexican agricultural system and 
cause even more reliance on foreign sources of corn supply for animal feed and consumer 
food. This change may cause significant supply shocks to the food supply, subsequently 
raising prices and inordinately affecting the Mexican poor. The United States Department 
of Energy data on Mexican biodiesel and ethanol fuel production from 2007 to 2010 
ranges from 36,500 to 146,000 barrels per year. This compares with 167 million to 324 
million barrels in the United States per year over the same period. Environmental 
concerns in Mexico of the impact on environmental quality similar to that experienced in 
the dead zone of the northern Gulf of Mexico may direct national goals away from 
ethanol production in an effort to reduce nitrogen and phosphorous as recommended for 
the United States by Simpson et al. (2007). This dead zone, or area of hypoxia (depletion 
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of oxygen required to support marine life), is caused by excessive nutrient pollution 
covering from 1,197 to 6,213 square miles of the Gulf of Mexico at the mouth of the 
Mississippi River (United States Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration 2012). Babcock and Fabiosa (2011), modeling ethanol 
production from 2005 through 2009, demonstrated that although ethanol production 
affects United States domestic corn prices, other commodity market prices and supplies 
affect the price of corn more significantly.  
The impact of the third member of NAFTA, Canada, merits review with respect 
to the interaction of its corn industry with that of Mexico. The Canadian Wheat Board 
(Canadian Wheat Board 2012) provides a summary of the history and focus of Canadian 
government price supports. Canada has nationalized grain market prices since 1934, and 
this effects trade with United States and Mexico. Most of the trade tensions, however, 
occur between the western provinces of Canada and the north central plains states in the 
United States. Although the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) controlled corn commodity 
prices during World War II, only wheat and barley are currently controlled and centrally 
priced by the CWB. The CWB does specify corn product quality for the Canadian Grain 
Commission under the Canada Grain Regulations – Section 5 and in that sense influences 
Canadian corn production. (Canadian Grain Commission 2012).  
Canadian production capacity and domestic need for corn mitigate Canadian 
influence on corn production and corn imports in Mexico. Despite Canadian government 
influences on corn production, Canadian production tonnage from 2007 to 2011 are only 
49 percent of Mexican corn production and only 3.4 percent of United States corn 
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production, and as such has only marginal impact on NAFTA corn trade. Canadian corn 
producers provide 90 percent of domestic consumption (USDA, FAS 2012).  
Theoretical Framework 
Feed grain trade imbalances under NAFTA between the United States and 
Mexico are affected by multiple variables. To determine the strength and likelihood of 
effect a regression of these variables is evaluated for each of the years 1986 through 
2007. Annual Mexican imports of corn from the United States, measured in 1,000 metric 
tons per year, are used as a proxy for unbalanced feed grain trade, the dependent variable. 
Each of the seven independent variables is a ratio that reflects reductions in cost or 
increases in productivity between the United States and Mexico that are expected to 
impact corn imports. The ratio of total corn production in each country reflects national 
capacity of available arable land and cost/benefit decisions of land use. Productivity of 
land and yield, (which measures efficiency as a ratio of average metric tons of harvested 
corn per hectare) United States/Mexico reflects the soil and climate effects. Natural soil 
productive capacity affects costs of production that may not be related to other inputs or 
market effects of trade. 
Technology is measured as the ratio of tons of fertilizer used per hectare of arable 
land, and farm machinery equipment, measured as the ratio of tractor count per 100 
square kilometers of arable land.  These two measures quantify the ratio of United 
States/Mexico invested working capital. The United States Department of Agriculture, 
Economic Research Service, Feed Grains Backgrounder (2007) contends that technology 
provides efficiency in agricultural production.  
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National government subsidies of the farm sector can affect and unbalance trade. 
Two comprehensive measures of agricultural subsidies are the Producer Support Estimate 
(PSE) and the General Services Support Estimate (GSSE) noted by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These, with the Consumer Support 
Estimate (CSE), comprise a Total [agricultural] Services Support Estimate (TSE) of a 
nation. The PSE measures the “annual monetary value of gross transfers . . . to support 
agricultural producers, measured at farm gate . . .” (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 2003, under “Glossary of Statistical Terms, Producer 
Support Estimate (PSE)”). The GSSE contains support of research and development, 
agricultural schools, inspections services, infrastructure, marketing and promotion, public 
stockholding, and some miscellaneous agricultural payments. The GSSE measures other 
“annual monetary value of gross transfers to services provided collectively to agriculture 
and arising from policy measures which support agriculture, regardless of their nature, 
objectives and impacts on farm production, income, or consumption of farm products” 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2003, under “Glossary of 
Statistical Terms, General Services Support Estimate (GSSE)”). PSE and GSSE ratios of 
United States/Mexico reflect government financial involvement in agriculture and effects 
of international trade markets. The impact of domestic subsidies on agricultural products 
is attested by Bhagwati and Mavroidis (2004), Stiglitz and Charlton (2005), and Burstein 
(2007). 
Methodology 
United States agricultural policy with the wide and deep array of domestic grain 
subsidies may reduce Mexico’s competitive position with the United States in labor costs 
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and other costs of grain production. This research addresses this effect at a composite 
level, assessing whether and to what extent this occurs. United States domestic subsidies 
and other agricultural production advantages adversely affect the trade balance in feed 
grains, especially maize, in Mexico. Hypotheses are: 
H1:  The relative increase of United States domestic producer support subsidies 
compared to Mexico result in negative corn trade balances for Mexico with the United 
States, under NAFTA.  
H2:  The relative increase of United States domestic general services support 
subsidies compared to Mexico result in negative corn trade balances for Mexico with the 
United States, under NAFTA. 
H3:  The relative increase of United States domestic consumer support subsidies 
compared to Mexico result in negative corn trade balances for Mexico with the United 
States, under NAFTA. 
H4:  The relative increase of United States domestic corn production compared to 
Mexico results in negative corn trade balances for Mexico with the United States, under 
NAFTA. 
H5:  The relative increase of United States domestic corn production efficiency 
compared to Mexico results in negative corn trade balances for Mexico with the United 
States, under NAFTA. 
H6:  The relative increase of United States agricultural use of fertilizer compared 
to Mexico results in negative corn trade balances for Mexico with the United States, 
under NAFTA. 
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H7:  The relative increase of United States agricultural use of farm equipment 
compared to Mexico results in negative corn trade balances for Mexico with the United 
States, under NAFTA. 
The data for Mexican imports of United States corn are from the United Nations 
Food and Agriculture Organization for 1986 through 1988, and from the United States 
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service for 1989 through 2007. Feed 
grain production data are obtained from the United States Department of Agriculture, 
Foreign Agricultural Service. Technology data for fertilizer consumption and machinery 
use are from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. Producer Support 
Estimates (PSE), General Services Support Estimates (GSSE), and Consumer Support 
Estimates (CSE) are from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). 
Feed grain trade imbalances under NAFTA between the United States and 
Mexico are evaluated using linear multiple regression addressing multiple causal 
variables each of the years 1986 through 2007. This is shown as: 
Y = B0 + B1x1 + … Bnxtn + Ut 
Such that, UFGT = f (P, L, F, T, PS, GS, CS), where UFGT is the dependent variable of 
corn imports from the United States into Mexico measured in 1,000 metric tons per year 
(Table 1). 
  
 24 
 
Table 1 
 
Data Sources – Mexican Corn Imports from the United States 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Year  Corn 
 Imports 
 (1,000 Metric Tons) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1986   1,703.58  
1987   3,602.90  
1988   3,301.83  
1989   4,856.05  
1990   2,028.08  
1991      918.79  
1992      520.98  
1993   1,479.55  
1994   3,001.74  
1995   6,477.19  
1996   3,161.57  
1997   4,126.88  
1998   5,453.89  
1999   4,804.24  
2000   5,944.55  
2001   4,517.34  
2002   5,288.34  
2003   5,682.53  
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 1 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Year  Corn 
 Imports 
 (1,000 Metric Tons) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
2004   5,885.48  
2005   6,335.94  
2006   8,767.87  
2007   9,817.61  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note:  Source:  United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. 
 
P reflects national capacity as the ratio of United States to Mexican annual corn 
production measured in 1,000 metric tons per year. L reflects efficiency as the 
comparative yield ratio of the United States to Mexico measured in average metric tons 
per hectare.  Both are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Data Sources – Production 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Year  U. S. Mexico U.S./Mexico U.S.  Mexico  U.S./Mexico 
 Production Production Production Yield   Yield   Yield  
 1,000 Metric 1,000 Metric Ratio  (MT/ha) (MT/ha) Ratio 
 Tons  Tons 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1980 168,648 10,400   16.22    1.28   5.71   4.46 
1981 206,223 12,500   16.50    1.53   6.84    4.47 
1982 209,181 7,000   29.88    1.17   7.11    6.08 
1983 106,031 9,300   11.40    1.43   5.09     3.56 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Year  U. S. Mexico U.S./Mexico U.S.  Mexico  U.S./Mexico 
 Production Production Production Yield   Yield   Yield  
 1,000 Metric 1,000 Metric Ratio  (MT/ha) (MT/ha) Ratio 
 Tons  Tons 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1984 194,881 9,900   19.68    1.57   6.70    4.27 
1985 225,447 10,500   21.47    1.69   7.41    4.38 
1986 208,944 10,000   20.89    1.67   7.49    4.49 
1987 181,143 9,900   18.30    1.65   7.52     4.56 
1988 125,194 10,100   12.40    1.68   5.31    3.16 
1989 191,320 9,750   19.62    1.68   7.30    4.35 
1990 201,534 14,100   14.29    2.14   7.44    3.48 
1991 189,868 14,689   12.93    2.10   6.82    3.25 
1992 240,719 18,631   12.92    2.47   8.25    3.34 
1993 160,986 19,276     8.35    2.49   6.32    2.54 
1994 255,295 16,994   15.02    2.12   8.70    4.10 
1995 187,970 17,780   10.57    2.29   7.12    3.11 
1996 234,518 18,922   12.39    2.30   7.98    3.47 
1997 233,864 17,368   13.47    2.41   7.95     3.30 
1998 247,882 17,789   13.93    2.26   8.44    3.73 
1999 239,549 19,240   12.45    2.66   8.40    3.16 
2000 251,854 17,917   14.06    2.51   8.59    3.42 
2001 241,377 20,400   11.83    2.62   8.67    3.31 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Year  U. S. Mexico U.S./Mexico U.S.  Mexico  U.S./Mexico 
 Production Production Production Yield   Yield   Yield  
 1,000 Metric 1,000 Metric Ratio  (MT/ha) (MT/ha) Ratio 
 Tons  Tons 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2002 227,767 19,280   11.81    2.74   8.12    2.96 
2003 256,229 21,800   11.75    2.83   8.92    3.15 
2004 299,876 22,050   13.60    2.87   10.06    3.51 
2005 282,263 19,500   14.48    2.94   9.29    3.16 
2006 267,503 22,350   11.97    3.03   9.36    3.09 
2007 331,177 23,600   14.03    3.22   9.46    2.94 
2008 307,142 24,226   12.68    3.31   9.66    2.92 
2009 332,549 20,374   16.32    3.24   10.34    3.19 
2010 316,165 21,130   14.96    3.02   9.59    3.18 
2011 313,918 20,500   15.31    3.08   9.24    3.00 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note:  Source:  United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, Production, Supply and Distribution Online 
(PSD)  
Technology effects are measured by F, the United States/Mexico ratio of 
kilograms of fertilizer used per hectare of arable land. Mexico data is found in Table 3, 
and United States and the United States/Mexico ratios in Table 4. Technology effects are 
also measured by T, the United States/Mexico ratio of tractors per 100 square kilometers 
of arable land (Table 5). Each of these tables presents data from the Food and 
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. 
  
 28 
 
Table 3 
 
Data sources – Technology, Fertilizer Consumption - Mexico 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Year  Total Fertilizer Total Fertilizer Arable land Arable land Fertilizer 
 Consumption Consumption (sq. km) (Hectare)         kg/ha  
(tons) (kg) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1980  1,237,913  1,237,913,000  23,000  2,300,000 538.22 
1981  1,560,985  1,560,985,000  23,050  2,305,000 677.22 
1982  1,671,942  1,671,942,000  23,138  2,313,800 722.60 
1983  1,485,800  1,485,800,000  23,138  2,313,800 642.15 
1984  1,660,900  1,660,900,000  23,138  2,313,800 717.82 
1985  1,764,100  1,764,100,000  23,300  2,330,000 757.12 
1986  1,796,600  1,796,600,000  23,500  2,350,000 764.51 
1987  1,887,880  1,887,880,000  23,700  2,370,000 796.57 
1988  1,757,400  1,757,400,000  23,900  2,390,000 735.31 
1989  1,739,900  1,739,900,000  24,100  2,410,000 721.95 
1990  1,798,400  1,798,400,000  24,300  2,430,000 740.08 
1991  1,619,400  1,619,400,000  24,450  2,445,000 662.33 
1992  1,616,000  1,616,000,000  24,600  2,460,000 656.91 
1993  1,591,900  1,591,900,000  24,800  2,480,000 641.90 
1994  1,647,900  1,647,900,000  24,900  2,490,000 661.81 
1995  1,286,000  1,286,000,000  25,100  2,510,000 512.35 
1996  1,636,400  1,636,400,000  25,000  2,500,000 654.56 
1997  1,644,100  1,644,100,000  25,000  2,500,000 657.64 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Year  Total Fertilizer Total Fertilizer Arable land Arable land Fertilizer 
 Consumption Consumption (sq. km) (Hectare)         kg/ha  
(tons) (kg) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1998  1,804,300  1,804,300,000  25,100  2,510,000 718.84 
1999  1,776,000  1,776,000,000  25,100  2,510,000 707.57 
2000  1,832,000  1,832,000,000  25,100  2,510,000 729.88 
2001  1,865,378  1,865,378,000  25,100  2,510,000 743.18 
2002  1,512,561  1,512,561,000  25,100  2,510,000 602.61 
2003  1,578,326  1,578,326,000  25,100  2,510,000 628.82 
2004  1,699,189  1,699,189,000  25,100  2,510,000 676.97 
2005  1,841,638  1,841,638,000  25,000  2,500,000 736.66 
2006  1,611,570  1,611,570,000  24,500  2,450,000 657.78 
2007  1,756,532  1,756,532,000  24,453  2,445,300 718.33 
2008  1,203,288  1,203,288,000  25,202  2,520,200 477.46 
2009  1,300,321  1,300,321,000  25,133  2,513,300 517.38 
Table 4 
 
Data sources – Technology, Fertilizer Consumption – United States and U.S./Mexico 
Input Ratio 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Year Total Fertilizer Total Fertilizer Arable land Arable land Fertilizer  U.S./ 
 Consumption Consumption (sq. km)  (Hectare)  kg/Ha Mexico 
 (ton) (kg)  Input  
  Ratio 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1980 21,479,946   21,479,946,000      188,755  18,875,500  1137.98 2.11 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Year Total Fertilizer Total Fertilizer Arable land Arable land Fertilizer  U.S./ 
 Consumption  Consumption (sq. km)  (Hectare)  kg/Ha Mexico 
 (ton) (kg)  Input  
  Ratio 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1981  19,438,990   19,438,990,000      188,755  18,875,500  1029.85 1.52 
1982  16,415,911   16,415,911,000      187,765  18,776,500    874.28 1.21 
1983  19,767,528   19,767,528,000      187,765  18,776,500  1052.78 1.64 
1984  19,688,206   19,688,206,000      187,765  18,776,500  1048.56 1.46 
1985  17,830,541   17,830,541,000      187,765  18,776,500     949.62 1.25 
1986  17,285,666   17,285,666,000      187,765  18,776,500    920.60 1.20 
1987  17,792,358   17,792,358,000      185,742  18,574,200    957.91 1.20 
1988  17,733,130   17,733,130,000      185,742  18,574,200    954.72 1.30 
1989  18,709,234   18,709,234,000      185,726  18,572,600  1007.36 1.40 
1990  18,586,936   18,586,936,000      185,676  18,567,600  1001.04 1.35 
1991  18,784,000   18,784,000,000      185,676  18,567,600  1011.65 1.53 
1992  18,991,000   18,991,000,000      184,080  18,408,000  1031.67 1.57 
1993  20,349,600   20,349,600,000      182,748  18,274,800  1113.53 1.73 
1994  19,297,270   19,297,270,000      181,939  18,193,900  1060.65 1.60 
1995  20,037,976   20,037,976,000      181,839  18,183,900  1101.96 2.15 
1996  20,310,309   20,310,309,000      179,006  17,900,600  1134.62 1.73 
1997  20,165,250   20,165,250,000      177,592  17,759,200  1135.48 1.73 
1998  19,773,874   19,773,874,000      176,782  17,678,200  1118.55 1.56 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Year Total Fertilizer Total Fertilizer Arable land Arable land Fertilizer  U.S./ 
 Consumption  Consumption (sq. km)  (Hectare)  kg/Ha Mexico 
 (ton) (kg)  Input  
  Ratio 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1999  19,563,478   19,563,478,000      175,368  17,536,800  1115.57 1.58 
2000  18,794,978   18,794,978,000      175,368  17,536,800  1071.75 1.47 
2001  19,614,367   19,614,367,000      175,400  17,540,000  1118.26 1.50 
2002  19,462,900   19,462,900,000      172,977  17,297,700  1125.17 1.87 
2003  20,520,700   20,520,700,000      171,634  17,163,400  1195.61 1.90 
2004  20,492,900   20,492,900,000      167,056  16,705,600  1226.71 1.81 
2005  19,582,600   19,582,600,000      165,115  16,511,500  1186.00 1.61 
2006  20,247,000   20,247,000,000      160,341  16,034,100  1262.75 1.92 
2007  19,975,100   19,975,100,000      161,780  16,178,000  1234.71 1.72 
2008  17,371,900   17,371,900,000      163,661  16,366,100  1061.46 2.22 
2009  17,794,000   17,794,000,000      162,751  16,275,100  1093.33 2.11 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note:  Source:  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 
Table 5 
Data sources – Technology, Agricultural Machinery  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Year United States Tractors  Mexico Tractors   U.S./  
 Tractors per 100  Tractors per 100         Mexico 
   km
2
 of     km2 of              Ratio 
   Arable Land    Arable Land 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1980  4,726,000  250.3774734   115,057  50.02478261  5.01 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 5 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Year United States Tractors  Mexico Tractors   U.S./  
 Tractors per 100  Tractors per 100         Mexico 
   km
2
 of     km2 of              Ratio 
   Arable Land    Arable Land 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1981  4,697,000  248.8410903   143,078  62.07288503  4.01 
1982  4,669,000  248.6618912   146,083  63.13553462  3.94 
1983  4,671,000  248.7684073   152,319  65.83066816  3.78 
1984  4,676,000  249.0346976   155,000  66.98936814  3.72 
1985  4,670,000  248.7151493   178,571  76.63991416  3.25 
1986  4,730,000  251.910633   202,141  86.01744681  2.93 
1987  4,789,000  257.8307545   225,712  95.2371308  2.71 
1988  4,548,492  244.882256   250,000  104.6025105  2.34 
1989  4,487,595  241.6244898   272,900  113.2365145  2.13 
1990  4,426,699  238.4098645   300,000  123.4567901  1.93 
1991  4,365,802  235.1301191   317,313  129.7803681  1.81 
1992  4,304,906  233.8606041   312,408  126.995122  1.84 
1993  4,317,974  236.2802329   307,503  123.9931452  1.91 
1994  4,331,042  238.0491264   302,597  121.5248996  1.96 
1995  4,344,109  238.8986411   297,692  118.6023904  2.01 
1996  4,357,177  243.4095505   292,787  117.114800  2.08 
1997  4,370,245  246.0834384   287,882  115.152800  2.14 
1998  4,414,705  249.7259336   282,977  112.7398406  2.22 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 5 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Year United States Tractors  Mexico Tractors   U.S./  
 Tractors per 100  Tractors per 100         Mexico 
   km
2
 of     km2 of              Ratio 
   Arable Land    Arable Land 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1999  4,459,165  254.2747251   278,072  110.7856574  2.30 
2000  4,503,625  256.8099653   273,166  108.8310757  2.36 
2001  4,548,085  259.2978905   268,261  106.8768924  2.43 
2002  4,592,545  265.5003266   263,356  104.9227092  2.53 
2003  4,551,998  265.2154002   258,451  102.9685259  2.58 
2004  4,511,452  270.0562686   253,546  101.0143426  2.67 
2005  4,470,905  270.7752173   248,640    99.456000  2.72 
2006  4,430,359  276.3085549   243,735    99.48367347   2.78 
2007  4,389,812  271.344542   238,830    97.66899767   2.78 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note:  Source:  The World Bank – Global Development Finance Database. 
PS is the ratio of the Producer Support Estimate subsidies between the United 
States and Mexico (Table 6), GS is the ratio of the General Services Support Estimate 
subsidies between the United States and Mexico (Table 6), and CS is the ratio of United 
States/Mexico Consumer Support subsidies (Table 6). 
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Table 6 
 
Data sources – Subsidies  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Year  Mexico U.S.       PSE  Mexico    U.S. GSSE Mexico U.S. CSE 
          PSE PSE       Ratio GSSE      GSSE Ratio CSE CSE Ratio 
        USDmn USDmn  USDmn   USDmn  USDmn USDmn 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1986      550      38,019    69.15 999 13,481 13.50 781 (4,167) (5.34) 
1987   1,077      39,118    36.32 542 13,387 24.71 346 (6,076) (17.56) 
1988     (90)      31,520 (349.10) 499 14,179 28.42 1,602 (1,140) (0.71) 
1989    2,574     38,637    15.01 695 15,456 22.25 (850) (9,635) 11.33  
1990    4,303     31,265      7.27 1,270 16,856 13.27 (3,078) (1,044) 0.34  
1991    7,528     30,734      4.08 905 20,963 23.15 (5,803) (560) 0.10  
1992    8,300     31,585      3.81 1,102 24,199 21.96 (6,101) 1,372 (0.22) 
1993    9,484     33,819      3.57 1,308 26,456 20.23 (6,990) 587 (0.08) 
1994    7,005     29,059      4.15 1,167 28,047 24.02 (3,310) 2,485 (0.75) 
1995   (1,059)   20,423   (19.28) 551 27,216 49.37 2,440 7,383 3.03  
1996    1,541     29,161    18.92 541 25,564 47.26 203 2,840 14.00  
1997    4,285     30,258      7.06 371 24,253 65.43 (2,460) 3,133 (1.27) 
1998    5,191     46,485      8.96 417 22,629 54.26 (3,479) (5,059) 1.45  
1999    5,246     55,746    10.63 508 22,520 44.30 (3,911) (4,684) 1.20  
2000    7,397     52,278      7.07 628 22,382 35.61 (5,416) (466) 0.09  
2001    6,484     51,040      7.87 649 24,141 37.19 (4,238) (1,236) 0.29  
2002    9,227     40,335      4.37 629 26,944 42.82 (7,088) 3,823 (0.54) 
2003    6,610     36,091      5.46 878 30,696 34.94 (4,023) 9,863 (2.45) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 6 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Year  Mexico U.S.       PSE  Mexico    U.S. GSSE Mexico U.S. CSE 
          PSE PSE       Ratio GSSE      GSSE Ratio CSE CSE Ratio 
         USDmn USDmn   USDmn   USDmn  USDmn USDmn 
________________________________________________________________________ 
2004    4,260     43,254    10.15 823 32,850 39.90 (1,769) 9,100 (5.14) 
2005    5,007     40,629      8.11 815 35,830 43.97 (1,776) 14,474 (8.15) 
2006    5,572     30,561      5.48 775 38,399 49.55 (1,780) 20,372 (11.44) 
2007    6,119     33,203      5.43 982 37,809 38.52 (1,865) 12,172 (6.53) 
2008    6,320     27,043      4.28 835 45,088 53.98 (921) 27,129 (29.47) 
2009    5,821     30,598      5.26 764 56,651 74.17 (1,760) 28,631 (16.26) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note:  Source:  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
As these ratios (Table 7) increase the research hypothesis is that there is an 
increase in a negative trade balance in corn for Mexico.  
Table 7 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Data sources – Regression Data  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Year Maize  U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. 
 Imports /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico 
 (1,000) Production Efficiency Fertilizer Tractor PSE  GSSE CSE 
 Metric Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio  Ratio  Ratio 
 Tons 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1986 1,703.58 20.89 4.49 1.20 2.93 69.15 13.50 -5.34 
1987 3,602.90 18.30 4.56 1.20  2.71 36.32 24.71 -17.56 
1988 3,301.83 12.40 3.16 1.30  2.34 (349.10) 28.42 -0.71 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 7 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Year Maize  U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. 
 Imports /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico 
 (1,000) Production Efficiency Fertilizer Tractor PSE  GSSE CSE 
 Metric Tons Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio  Ratio  Ratio 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1989 4,856.05 19.62 4.35 1.40  2.13 15.01 22.25 11.33 
1990 2,028.08 14.29 3.48 1.35 1.93 7.27 13.27 0.34 
1991 918.79 12.93 3.25 1.53 1.81 4.08 23.15 0.10 
1992 520.98 12.92 3.34 1.57 1.84 3.81 21.96 -0.22 
1993 1,479.55 8.35 2.54 1.73 1.91 3.57 20.23 -0.08 
1994 3,001.74 15.02 4.10 1.60 1.96 4.15 24.02 -0.75 
1995 6,477.19 10.57 3.11 2.15 2.01 (19.28) 49.37 3.03 
1996 3,161.57 12.39 3.47 1.73 2.08 18.92 47.26 14.00 
1997 4,126.88 13.47 3.30 1.73 2.14 7.06 65.43 -1.27 
1998 5,453.89 13.93 3.73 1.56  2.22 8.96 54.26 1.45 
1999 4,804.24 12.45 3.16 1.58 2.30 10.63 44.30 1.20 
2000 5,944.55 14.06 3.42 1.47 2.36 7.07 35.61 0.09 
2001 4,517.34 11.83 3.31 1.50 2.43 7.87 37.19 0.29 
2002 5,288.34 11.81 2.96 1.87 2.53 4.37 42.82 -0.54 
2003 5,682.53 11.75 3.15 1.90 2.58 5.46 34.94 -2.45 
2004 5,885.48 13.60 3.51 1.81 2.67 10.15 39.90 -5.14 
2005 6,335.94 14.48 3.16 1.61 2.72 8.11 43.97 -8.15 
2006 8,767.87 11.97 3.09 1.92 2.78 5.48 49.55 -11.44 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 7 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Year Maize  U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. 
 Imports /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico 
 (1,000) Production Efficiency Fertilizer Tractor PSE  GSSE CSE 
 Metric Tons Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio  Ratio  Ratio 
________________________________________________________________________ 
2007 9,817.61 14.03 2.94 1.72 2.78 5.43    38.52 -6.53 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Findings 
The regression model for these variables shows a high level of significance of 
.0059 with R-square and adjusted R-square values of .7079 and .5618 respectively (Table 
8).  
Table 8 
Regression Output 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Source               SS             df       MS Number of obs = 22 
  F(  7,  14) = 4.85 
Model           84217722.6     7  12031103.2 Prob > F = 0.0059 
Residual        34756962.6   14   2482640.18 R-squared = 0.7079 
  Adj R-squared = 0.5618 
Total              118974685    21   5665461.2 Root MSE = 1575.6 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Imports   Coef. Std. Err. t  P> t  [95% Conf. Interval] 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Production   435.1176 364.7258 1.19 0.253 -347.1415 1217.377 
Efficiency   -1588.243 1648.545 -0.96 0.352 -5124.022  1947.535 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 8 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Imports   Coef. Std. Err. t  P> t  [95% Conf. Interval] 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Fertilizer   4603.403 2553.782 1.80 0.093 -873.9151 10080.72 
Tractors   3059.115 1634.436 1.87 0.082 -446.4015 6564.631 
PSE    -3.528154 5.180063 -0.68 0.507 -14.63828 7.581976 
GSSE    55.41359 32.79305 1.69 0.113 -14.92051 125.7477 
CSE   .7624109 71.50022 0.01 0.992 -152.5903 154.1151 
Constant   -12555.83 6493.849 -1.93 0.074 -26483.75 1372.092 
________________________________________________________________________ 
The p-values for the independent variables are significant for two variables and 
marginally significant for another; the one-tail p-value for the United States/Mexico ratio 
of tractors per 100 square kilometers of arable land is .041 with a coefficient of 3059, 
United States/Mexico ratio of fertilizer consumption per hectare of arable land is .0465 
with a coefficient of 4603, and the United States/Mexico ratio of General Services 
Support Estimate (GSSE) at .0565 and with a coefficient of 55. The null hypotheses for 
these three independent variables are rejected. 
As the United States/Mexico ratio of tractors per 100 square kilometers of arable 
land increases by one, Mexican imports of corn from the United States, as indicated by 
the coefficient, increase by 3,059,115 metric tons. The average number of tractors per 
100 square kilometers during the period studied is 252 in the United States and 110 in 
Mexico. A change in this tractor ratio by one requires an increase of the number of 
tractors in Mexico by 77.3 percent or 85 more tractors per 100 square kilometers.  This 
predicts a reduction of corn imports from the United States by 3,059,155 metric tons per 
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year. A decrease of 30 percent or 33 tractors per 100 square kilometers in Mexico will 
also result in this magnitude of change, increasing the corn imports by 3,059,155 metric 
tons per year. These results indicate that over the 22 years in this study there is strong 
predictability between use of agricultural equipment in Mexico and the rate of 
importation of corn into Mexico from the United States.  
As the United States/Mexico ratio of fertilizer per hectare of arable land increases 
by one, as indicated by the coefficient, Mexican imports of corn from the United States 
increase by 4,603,403 metric tons or approximately one half of the average imports per 
year over the period studied. The average kilograms of fertilizer per hectare of arable 
land consumed during the period studied is 1,095 in the United States and 688 in Mexico. 
A 168 percent increase or 1,162 more kilograms of fertilizer per hectare in Mexico will 
result in this magnitude of change, decreasing Mexican imports of corn from the United 
States by 4,603,403 metric tons per year. Likewise, a 38.5 percent decrease in fertilizer 
use in Mexico of 265 kilograms per hectare predicts a corresponding increase in Mexican 
imports of corn from the United States of 4,603,403 metric tons annually.  
As the United States/Mexico ratio of GSSE increase by one, as indicated by the 
coefficient, imports of corn increase by 55,140 metric tons. This ratio averages 7.33 per 
year throughout the period studied, with United States averaging 36.286 billion USD per 
year and Mexico 4.948 billion USD. An increase of United States GSSE expenditure of 
4.948 billion USD, or a decrease of Mexican GSSE expenditure of .5937 billion USD 
results in an increase of this ratio by one, reflecting an increase of imports of 55,140 
metric tons annually. Also, a decrease of United States GSSE expenditure of 4.948 billion 
USD or an increase of Mexican GSSE expenditure of .781 billion USD results in a 
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decrease of this ratio by one, reflecting a decrease of imports of 55,140 metric tons 
annually. Although GSSE has a marginal 1-tail p-value of .0565, corn exports of 55,140 
metric tons to Mexico is not a meaningful coefficient. 
The rest of the independent variables have p-values with much less significance. 
The 1-tail p-values for these variables include .1265 for the production ratio, .176 for the 
production efficiency ratio, .2535 for the Producer Support Estimate (PSE) subsidy ratio, 
and .496 for the Consumer Support Estimate (CSE) subsidy ratio. These United 
States/Mexico ratios do not predict the dependent variable of tonnage of United States 
exports of corn to Mexico. 
The null hypothesis cannot be rejected for production or efficiency ratios, 
Producer Support Estimate (PSE) subsidies, or for Consumer Support Estimate (CSE) 
subsidies, but is rejected for the technology input ratios (fertilizer consumption and farm 
equipment use) and General Services Support Estimate (GSSE) subsidies. Changes to 
ratios of farm equipment use, fertilizer consumption, and General Services Support 
Estimate (GSSE) subsidies do predict changes in United States exports of corn to 
Mexico. 
Analysis 
The purpose of this model is to demonstrate the effects of government subsidies, 
national production levels, and the application of technology on the quantity of net 
imports of corn into Mexico from the United States.  The data provides a sample size of 
22 observed years.  The time-series model satisfies the assumptions of the classical linear 
regression model; the data is linear in its parameters, there is no perfect collinearity 
among the independent variables, it possesses a zero conditional mean for each year, the 
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data is homoscedastic, there is no serial correlation between time periods, and the errors 
of the independent variables are normally distributed. 
The model’s residual plots, residual-versus-predictor (Figures 1-7) indicate the 
independent variables of the model follow a random pattern, indicating a good fit of the 
data for linear regression analysis.  The data are neither non-random U-shaped, non-
random inverted U-shaped, nor trending.  None of the independent variables are 
constants, or a perfect linear combination of others.  The model has relatively small 
residual with an F statistic of .0059, indicating that for each observation the expected 
value of the error is zero.   These evidences provide that the estimators are unbiased 
indicators of the model; the ordinary least squares (OLS) of this model are unbiased.   
 
 
Figure 1.  Residuals for the independent variable production. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Residuals for the independent variable efficiency. 
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Figure 3.  Residuals for the independent variable fertilizer. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Residuals for the independent variable tractors. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Residuals for the independent variable Producer Support Estimate Subsidy 
(PSE). 
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Figure 6.  Residuals for the independent variable General Services Support Estimate 
Subsidy (GSSE). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Residuals for the independent variable Consumer Support Estimate Subsidy 
(CSE). 
 
The model’s residual plots also demonstrate a variance of the errors and so 
demonstrate that the model is homoscedastic. The unobserved variables affecting the 
dependent variable have a constant variance over time. The errors in different time 
periods are also uncorrelated; there is no serial correlation. Durbin-Watson test of the 
model reveals Durbin-Watson Statistic D values, for the independent variables with 
significant p-values, between the lower critical value DL and the upper critical value DU 
indicating inability to determine autocorrelation of this data set with the Durbin-Watson 
test (Table 9).  
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Table 9 
 
Durbin-Watson Statistic Values 
________________________________________________________________  
Model, IV k n     D  DW table used   DL   DU 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Fertilizer 8 22 1.366926  5%  0.863 1.940 
Tractors 8 22 1.366926  5%  0.863 1.940 
GSSE  8 22 1.366926  5%  0.863 1.940 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Given that these data satisfy the five assumptions of a time-series model the OLS 
estimators (Gauss-Markov theorem) they are the best linear unbiased estimates (BLUE) 
of the variables in this model. The errors for each time period are independent of the 
causal variables and are distributed in a normal distribution (Wooldridge 2006, 352, 354). 
Since this model fits the classic linear regression model assumptions, we can accept that 
the causal variables in this model affect the response variable of imported corn from the 
United States into Mexico. 
Goodness of fit for this model also explains the variance of the coefficient of 
determination (R-square) and adjusted R-square, which are .7079 and .5618, respectively. 
The adjusted R-square compensates for lost degrees of freedom by reducing the 
explained variance of the model for each additional independent variable. Although a 
longer time-series is desired, this data set provides the available and most consistent data 
set for this study. The independent variables in this model account for over 56 percent of 
the variation in the model, and the calculated F statistic for the model of .0059 indicates 
that the probability of this influence by the independent variables occurring solely by 
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chance is remote. This provides confidence that the model is accounting for significant 
changes in corn trade balance between the United States and Mexico. 
Three independent variables provide p-values that indicate significant 
probabilities. The residual plots for these independent variables (Figures 1-7) reveal 
random patterns confirming the randomness and homoscedasticity of the data. The 
findings of this model are consistent with other research and established trade theory, as 
Bulmer-Thomas (2003) describes the propensity of the organizational infrastructures of 
industrialized countries overwhelming competition from lesser developed countries, and 
Bhagwati’s describes the implementation of the “aggressive unilateralism” of strong 
economies against weaker competitors (Bhagwati 1994, 231). 
Ratio of farm equipment in the United States and Mexico using as a proxy the 
number of tractors per 100 square kilometers of arable land has a 2-tailed test value of 
.082, a 1-tailed .041 p-value to predict negative trade balances of corn in Mexico with the 
United States. The coefficient of 3059.115 indicates that with this high degree of 
certainty (p-value) a change in unity of the United States/Mexico tractor ratio per 100 
square kilometers predicts an increase of this unbalanced corn trade by a factor of one-
third of the average tonnage per year over the period studied. The ratio of consumed 
fertilizer per hectare of arable land in the United States and Mexico has a 2-tailed test 
value of .093 and a 1-tailed 0.0465 p-value to predict negative trade balances of corn in 
Mexico with the United States. The coefficient of 4603.403 indicates that with this high 
degree of certainty (p-value) a change in unity of the United States/Mexico fertilizer 
consumption ratio per hectare of arable land predicts an increase of this unbalanced corn 
trade by a factor of one half of the annual corn trade per year over the period studied. 
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The ratio of General Services Support Estimate (GSSE) in the United States and 
Mexico has a 2-tailed test value of .113, for this measure a 1-tailed 0.056 p-value to 
predict negative trade balances of corn by Mexico with the United States. The coefficient 
of 55.41359 indicates that with this moderate degree of certainty (p-value) a change in 
unity of the United States/Mexico GSSE expenditure results in an increase of this 
unbalanced annual corn trade by 55,414 metric tons annually.  
The independent variables in this model are ratios of national quantities of the 
United States and Mexico. Yield (L) and fertilizer (F) are compared per hectare. This 
model demonstrates that as the ratios of the United States/Mexico domestic farm 
equipment use, fertilizer consumption, and General Service Support subsidies increase 
the Mexican imports of United States corn from 1986 through 2007 increased.  The null 
hypotheses for these data are rejected. There are strong probabilities with measurable 
coefficients that increasing the United States/Mexico ratios of farm equipment use and 
fertilizer consumption increase corn imports to Mexico from the United States. The 
United States/Mexico GSSE ratio demonstrates in this model, a moderate probability, and 
with measured coefficients, that increases in the United States/Mexico GSSE ratio of 
domestic expenditure predicts a moderate, but measureable, increase in unbalanced trade 
in corn in Mexico with the United States.  
What is most surprising from this study is that Producer Support Estimates; 
payments to the farmers, and Consumer Support Estimates, government support of 
market consumption, are not significant in this model. Others, such as Burstein (2007) 
advocate that subsidies paid to United States farmers (producers) directly affect the costs 
and prices of the supply chain of corn and its delivery to Mexico. This claim is not borne 
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out by this model. The findings of this model are that direct producer subsidies and 
consumer market subsidies are not found to affect the corn trade balance of the United 
States and Mexico, that PSE and CSE subsidies may not have implications for trade with 
Mexico, while GSSE does.  
Additionally, it is surprising that neither quantity of production as a ratio between 
the United States and Mexico, nor the yield ratio between these two countries possesses 
statistical significance with respect to unbalanced trade in corn in this model and, hence, 
provides no predictive power of Mexican corn imports from the United States. The null 
hypothesis is not rejected. These three measures of agricultural inputs in this model show 
no relation to the quantity of Mexican corn imports.  The application of this model to 
considerations of production, efficiency, PSE, and CSE is that none of these affect the 
corn trade balance of the United States and Mexico. 
Conclusions 
Relative agricultural production, yield ratios, and producer and consumer 
government subsidies between the United States and Mexico appear to have no impact on 
the amount of Mexican corn imported from the United States. Government subsidies in 
the form of General Services Support Estimate (GSSE), however, do predict the size of 
United States corn exports to Mexico. Further, the findings of this model indicate that 
increases in mechanization in the Mexican farming sector and increases in inputs such as 
fertilizer consumption in Mexico significantly predict reduction in unbalanced corn trade 
between the United States and Mexico. 
Policy implications for the United States government and subsequent legislative 
initiatives indicate that producer and consumer domestic subsidies do not have a 
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predictive impact on corn trade with Mexico and that increases in general services 
support expenditures have only moderate predictive and quantitative impact on this trade. 
Contentions that individual domestic farm supports or consumer supports for food affect 
international trade with Mexico are not borne out by this study. Furthermore, for both 
national governments, these findings show that domestic mechanization and associated 
domestic producer efficiency remain the most significant enhancers of production with 
subsequent effect on international corn trade.  
An economy’s size does matter to national growth. These findings are consistent 
with Bhagwati’s (1994, 231) insight and concern about the implementation of 
“aggressive multilateralism” of strong economies against weaker competitive nations, 
despite the tendency of international trade to increase the individual and public wealth of 
trading nations, in an effect described as a “lifting-all-boats” of the economies involved 
in that trade (Bhagwati 1994, 242). Bulmer-Thomas’ (2003) hypothesis also predicts that 
especially in technical productive capacity the organizational infrastructures of the most 
industrialized countries overwhelm lesser developed ones.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE EFFECT OF MEXICAN CORN IMPORTS AND MEXICAN AGRICULTURAL 
SUBSIDIES ON THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF  
THE MEXICAN RURAL POOR 
Introduction 
Unbalanced feed grain trade, especially corn, between the United States and 
Mexico, under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is said to adversely 
affect the welfare of rural Mexico (Burstein 2007).  Modern economic theory accepts the 
welfare enhancing effects of free trade (Stiglitz and Charlton 2005, 12), but free trade 
agreements do not always increase everyone’s welfare (Stiglitz and Charlton 2005, 28). 
During the first decade of free trade under NAFTA, economic growth in Mexico was 
slower than it had been prior to 1980, and the “mean real wages [in Mexico] at the end of 
the decade were lower, and some of the poorest had been made worse off as subsidized 
American agricultural products flooded the market and lowered the price received for 
Mexican domestic production.  Inequality and poverty both increased under NAFTA” 
(Stiglitz and Charlton 2005, 23). Other poverty-inducing factors exist, the impact of 
which are analyzed in this chapter.  Although Mexicans benefit from a cheaper 
consumption basket, this research investigates the effect of increasing Mexican imports 
of corn from the United States and the levels of Mexican agricultural subsidies on the 
welfare of the rural Mexican population. 
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Review of the Literature 
Theoretical Background 
Bhagwati, defending economic globalization and free trade, contends that 
countries with lower tariffs have higher rates of growth (Bhagwati 2004, 3). He shows 
that effects of free trade are welfare-enhancing for the poor (Bhagwati 2004, 60-64).   
Less sanguine about the benefits of free trade, Stiglitz notes that there is no 
conclusive empirical evidence that trade liberalization leads to national economic growth 
(Stiglitz and Charlton 2005, 33). He also notes that different regions approach policies of 
integration, openness, and free trade differently (Stiglitz and Charlton 2005, 20). East 
Asia, for example, does not follow orthodox free trade prescriptions, but dual policies of 
import protection and export promotion (Stiglitz and Charlton 2005, 16). Srinivasan and 
Bhagwati (1999) note that free trade can contribute to reduced income and growth when 
market failures exist in an economy. A regime of free trade may not effectively 
contribute to a nation’s success when it lacks institutional capacity and adequate 
investments in research and development to take advantage of market changes related to 
free trade (Stiglitz and Charlton 2005, 7, 30, 37, 89). Left alone, markets may not provide 
welfare-enhancing effects for a nation, and government intervention may be required to 
correct failures to make those markets work efficiently, as industries restructure and less 
skilled labor is eliminated (Stiglitz and Charlton 2005, 89). Agriculture, an example of a 
restructuring industry, is crucial to the economies of many developing countries with that 
sector accounting for as much as 40 percent of GDP and 70 percent of employment 
(Stiglitz and Charlton 2005, 120).  
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Bulmer-Thomas (2003, 16) documents that the role of tariffs in Latin America 
during the nineteenth century was to increase government revenue. Mexican trade policy 
evolved into import substitution from 1892 (Bulmer-Thomas 2003, 139) through 1989, 
when the Mexican National Development Plan was subsequently implemented by 
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari. A dramatic shift in economic policy occurred in 
Mexico following the 1982 debt crisis and resulted in the reluctant acceptance by 
Mexican authorities of a “New Economic Model (NEM) based on exports” that depended 
on a free trade regime (Bulmer-Thomas 2003, 353). Subsequent to implementation of this 
NEM the Mexican government did not implement public policies to protect those of its 
population most at risk in the shift of its economy to outward looking trade policies.  
Bagwell and Staiger (2002, 169) use a partial equilibrium model to explain the 
political and economic motivations of governments implementing agricultural subsidies. 
Although governments seek, for political reasons, to help their exporters (Bagwell and 
Staiger 2002, 31), prices are constrained by market conditions (Bagwell and Staiger 
2002, 170) and limit their action. Bagwell and Staiger note that since export-promoting 
governments seek to maximize profits less subsidy expenses, while in importing, a 
nation’s welfare is measured by consumer surplus, they predict that market inefficiencies 
result (Bagwell and Staiger 2002, 171). Preferential Trading Agreements (PTAs) are 
subject to negotiation and renegotiation of trade provisions and uncertain enforcement 
(Bagwell and Staiger 2002, 114). PTA implementation also involves lengthy transition 
timeframes (Bagwell and Staiger 2002, 116), allowing for competing voices in the 
political decision process and subsequently sub-optimal outcomes.  These processes 
undermine the intent and limit the extent of implementation of a free trade regime.  
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Modern agricultural export subsidies have been a source of contention dating 
from at least the 1958 wheat flour case when “a GATT panel ruled against a French 
export subsidy,” stating that it increased the French export market share against Australia 
(Bagwell and Staiger 2002, 164). In the 1980s, when a GATT panel ruled against the 
United States in favor of the European Community (Bagwell and Staiger 2002, 164) in a 
similar wheat flour case, the United States retaliated with an export subsidy, and the 
European Community subsequently responded in kind. This resulted in mounting subsidy 
war. A major goal of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations conducted within the 
context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994 was agricultural 
trade reform, and GATT Article XVI was subsequently altered, reducing allowed 
agricultural export subsidies of developed nations. Debate occurred between the United 
States with the Cairns Group of nations, and between the European Union (EU) and net-
food importing countries. The Cairns Group of nations was comprised Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay. The United States and Cairns Group 
wanted agricultural subsidies phased out, and the European Union (EU) and net-food 
importing countries wanted agricultural subsidies to remain in place (Bagwell and Staiger 
2002, 164). The unbalanced trade in feed grains, due to the domestic United States 
agricultural subsidies, is said to have resulted in the loss of agricultural employment in 
Mexico (Burstein 2007). Hanson (2007, 418), in the context of describing how 
globalization affects labor markets, notes a change in income distribution in the 1990s 
and lower levels of income for the Mexican poor. Nicita’s (2004) analysis of tariff 
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reductions from 1989 to 2000, especially in light of United States agricultural subsidies, 
determined that those tariff reductions adversely affected rural Mexican income. 
Effect on the Population 
Emmott (2003), Bacon (2008), Fayyaz (2008), and Zermeno (2008) note Mexican 
policies under free trade that negatively affect the rural poor. The Oxfam Report (2003) 
describes the Mexican corn sector being in acute crisis, stating, United States agricultural 
policy is directly linked to rural misery in Mexico and that surging imports have been 
associated with a steep decline in prices. Nicita (2004, 1) found that from 1989 to 2000 
domestic prices of most non-animal agricultural products fell as free trade was introduced 
to Mexico, resulting in lower agricultural household income. Although Mexican 
households benefited from lower consumption basket prices, the downward pressure on 
unskilled wages, found in higher concentrations in rural Mexico, hurt low-income 
families more than affluent households. 
Hanson (2003, 1) notes that 1980s Mexican trade policy reforms and the 1994 
adoption of NAFTA changed Mexico’s wage structure, which included increased demand 
for high-skilled workers. This occurred even though, as Hanson notes, “trade theory 
predicts that convergence in goods’ prices between countries creates pressure for 
convergence in factor prices. In Mexico, this [affects] both wage levels and the relative 
wages of low- and high-skilled labor” (Hanson 2003, 2).  Mexico’s trade policy reforms, 
however, raised the skill premium, a negative effect on an economy with comparatively 
less high-skilled workers, and at the same time reduced industry rents going to labor 
(Hanson 2003, 3). Though outcomes differ depending on industry and whether it is more 
closely aligned to imports or exports, Stopler and Samuelson (1941, 62) note that most 
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admit the possibility of a decline in the relative share of a large factor of production such 
as labor as a result of free trade; many even admit the possibility of a decline in the real 
income of a large factor of production. After demonstrating advantages of free trade for 
an economy, Stopler and Samuelson conclude that “if effects on the terms of trade can be 
disregarded, it has been shown that the harm which free trade inflicts upon one factor of 
production is necessarily less than the gain to the other. Hence, it is always possible to 
bribe the suffering factor by subsidy or other redistributive devices so as to leave all 
factors better off as a result of trade” (Stopler and Samuelson 1941, 73), and so indicate, 
among other things, that rural labor safety nets should remain in place with the 
implementation of a free trade regime such as NAFTA. Social safety programs did exist 
during the NAFTA implementation, but in phases and with changing policy intent 
(Esquivel 2010, 4). Hanson (2003, 3) also found that from 1990 to 2000 the wages of 
higher skilled labor and labor in northern Mexican states grew, while labor income 
shrank among the less skilled and among laborers in the southernmost Mexican states. In 
addition to free trade reform, efforts to implement new economic approaches, and 
concurrent with Mexico’s entry into NAFTA, Mexico privatized state-owned enterprises, 
deregulated entry restrictions in many industries, and used wage and price restraints 
(Hanson 2003, 4). These are policy responses to currency crises, especially in the early 
1980s, bouts of high inflation, and severe macroeconomic contractions (Hanson 2003, 3). 
Hanson attributes much of the wage disruption in Mexico, following implementation of 
free trade regimes from 1985 forward, to the elimination of institutionalized wages 
guaranteed to lower skilled workers and, by implication, to the agricultural industry. He 
indicates that industries that enjoyed favorable government policy, industry subsidization, 
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and subsequently subsidized wages “experienced relatively large reductions in wages and 
employment after trade reform” (Hanson 2003, 6). Arbache, Dickerson, and Green 
(2004) also show that expected outcomes of free trade on developing countries is varied 
and may not be as traditional theory suggests, that is; “not opposite of that in developed 
countries” (Arbache et al. 2004, 74). 
Arbache, Dickerson, and Green (2004) contend that wage dispersion and the level 
of employment in increasing international trade have contributed to the increase in the 
dispersion of wages and unemployment.  
Arbache, Dickerson, and Green (2004) state that 
the most immediate effect of trade [liberalization] is a reduction in the extent to 
which domestic manufacturers can operate in protected markets. The reduction or 
elimination of trade barriers and tariffs combine to turn any markets that were 
previously highly imperfect into markets that are now more contestable, and 
hence generate lower prices and reduced producer rents. To the extent that such 
rents were previously shared with employees, wages will also fall after trade 
[liberalization]” (2004 77). 
 
Effect on the Land 
The dominance of imported United States feed grain, especially maize into 
Mexico, changes agriculture and land uses. Keleman, Hellin, and Bellon (2009, 52) 
document that changes in economic policies related to free trade affect key social systems 
that generate and maintain maize landraces in Chiapas, Mexico. In this context landraces 
are indigenous cultivated plants commonly grown during earlier periods in human 
history, but not used in large-scale modern agriculture. These policy changes relate to the 
implementation of free trade and include the “elimination and reorienting of agricultural 
subsidies, and changes to the channels through which farmers access technical assistance, 
credit and market information” (Keleman et al. 2009, 53). High production costs, coupled 
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with low economic returns, make commercial maize farming less attractive for many 
small-scale farmers. 
Effect of the Free Trade Regime 
Nicita uses household survey data to derive the impact of Mexican trade 
liberalization on Mexican households by measuring “first-order (or impact) measurement 
effects in which the household cannot react to trade-liberalization price changes” (Nicita 
2004, 2) and second order effects: “the effects of trade liberalization on household 
earnings” (Nicita 2004, 2). Nicita also notes that “geographically dispersed households 
will be affected differently by trade liberalization” (Nicita 2004, 2). Throughout the 
period from 1989 to 2000 domestic prices of most non-animal agricultural products fell 
as free trade was introduced to Mexico. This resulted in lower agricultural household 
income due to lower commodity prices. However, all of the Mexican households 
benefited from lower consumption basket prices. “Downward pressure on unskilled 
wages hurt labor supplied by low-income households,” as the wealthy gained more than 
the poor and the northern states gained more real income than those states further south 
(Nicita 2004, 7, 30). Nicita (2004, 3, 27) finds that benefits of trade liberalization were 
disproportionately distributed to richer urban Mexican households.  Northern Mexican 
states benefited from Maquiladora industries and proximity to labor opportunities in the 
United States. 
Harrison (2007) notes that during the last two decades of the 20
th
 century poverty 
rates dropped in developing countries as poor countries slashed protective tariffs and 
increased their participation in world trade. Ianchovichina, Nicita, and Soloaga (2001) 
use a computable general equilibrium model of the Mexican economy to generate prices 
 57 
 
in a simulation to predict the impact of a tariff reform on population welfare. They find 
that the “impact of tariff reform on welfare [to] be positive in general for all expenditure 
deciles with the poor individuals benefiting proportionately more than the rich” 
(Ianchovichina et al. 2001, 19). The real need of the poor Mexican farmers was to receive 
income support during the 1990s as the free trade regime was implemented, and during 
this period small farmers lost income and large corn farmers gained (Harrison 2007, 4). 
Poverty in Mexico increased between 1990 and 2000 (Harrison 2007, 17).  
Harrison (2007) chronicles the decline in corn commodity prices and the use of 
the Mexican national social safety net for farmers during the implementation of 
NAFTA, that 
 
during the 1990s, imports of both white and yellow corn increased, and prices of 
Mexican corn fell. The majority of the poorest corn farmers [are] net consumers 
of corn and hence benefit . . . from the drop in corn prices. The income from corn 
production among middle-income farmers, who are mostly net sellers, fell, both 
as a share of total income and in absolute terms. The decline in income from corn 
production among . . . net sellers would have translated into an equivalent decline 
in real income if farmer incomes had not been supplemented with transfers 
through government programs such as PROCAMPO and PROGRESA. (2007, 1)  
 
Also, “evidence shows a clear link between export activity and poverty reduction 
in Colombia, Mexico, India, and Poland. This research suggests that efforts to dismantle 
barriers to developing-country exports” is beneficial to a nation (Harrison 2007, 27). 
Effect of Unbalanced Trade through Subsidies 
Export subsidies can be an attractive trading policy, providing cost advantages to 
domestic firms competing with similar export firms from other nations (Brander and 
Spencer 1985a, 83), and protecting the competitive markets of developing countries 
resulting in welfare benefits to the economy as a whole.  Export subsidies, however, are 
often the agricultural trading policy of developed nations. McMillan, Zwane, and Ashraf 
(2007, 183) state “Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
 58 
 
countries sell their agricultural products on world markets at prices that are below the 
cost of production.”  These policies harm poor countries, most of whose poor are farmers, 
by depressing world commodity prices. Mexico liberalized its corn sector in the mid-
1990s, with a subsequently “sharp decrease in the producer price of corn and an increase 
in Mexican corn imports from the United States” (McMillan et al. 2007, 185). Since the 
poorest of the Mexican farmers produce corn only for personal consumption, they are 
only indirectly affected by this reduction of corn prices. Medium sized Mexican farms are 
harmed while larger and commercial Mexican farming operations often receive transfer 
payments which offset market losses. The general population of developing countries 
does benefit from lower grain commodity prices (McMillan et al. 2007, 186). Findings 
indicate that 1) poorer countries are net importers of both cereals and food, 2) suppressed 
agricultural prices as a result of OECD subsidies benefit poor country consumers, and the 
poorest in these countries the most, 3) “NAFTA reduced the wedge between the real 
producer price and the border price, making corn production less profitable” (McMillan 
et al. 2007, 228), and 4) “the poorest corn farmers are net food buyers, since they have 
little land per person and so are forced to earn cash income in other ways in order to buy 
food” (McMillan et al. 2007, 228). 
Aisbett (2007, 41) emphasizes the importance of “identifying the causal 
mechanisms through which globalization affects the poor” and how a free trade regime is 
implemented, which often affects the condition of the poor and subsequent political 
reaction (Aisbett 2007, 34). Free trade can be evaluated by assessing trade restriction 
levels or assessing a country’s integration by measuring the flows of “goods, services, 
factors, and profits into and out of the country” (Aisbett 2007, 35). Subsidies are similar 
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to tariffs, and so are inconsistent with free trade, with respect to the first measure. 
However, subsidies tend to increase integration of trade with the rest of the world and 
may be seen as consistent with free trade by this second measure. 
Porto (2003) notes that studies on the relationship between trade and poverty in 
developing countries focus on the effects of national trade reforms, while WTO 
negotiations, especially as seen in the Doha Round, were more concerned with the 
poverty effects on low-income countries of foreign reforms, such as the elimination of 
agricultural subsidies in developed economies.  Porto found that, in the case of Argentina 
participating in the MERCOSUR regional trade agreement (Porto 2003, 13), “national 
trade reforms have larger marginal effects than foreign trade reforms, [but] since there is 
greater room for foreign reforms, policy changes in developed countries . . . have, in the 
end, larger poverty impacts,” and thus it is more important to the reduction of poverty for 
a country than its own policy reforms (Porto 2003, 1, 18). 
Summary 
Research has documented that unbalanced trade between the United States and 
Mexico has increased the standards of living of the general population of Mexico, while 
among the rural poor it may have increased poverty and inequality, increasing political 
discontent and less than optimal land use. New policies produce winners and losers, and 
these changes are consistent with Bhagwati (2004), and Stiglitz and Charlton’s (2005) 
views of development. The implementation of free trade policies between the United 
States and Mexico began in the 1980s, and was fully implemented with NAFTA. The 
unintended consequences of subsidized products from the United States have an adverse 
impact on the small and medium sized rural agriculture in Mexico. Mexican government 
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policies were less effective than needed in providing necessary safety nets for its rural 
population, especially during times of crisis such as the 1994-96 currency crisis. 
Theoretical Framework 
Contention between those for and opposed to free trade have evolved to some 
extent because of the lack of connections made between “empirical findings and policy 
conclusions” (Aisbett 2007, 40). Reimer discusses “cross-country regression analyses, 
partial equilibrium/costs-of-living analyses, general equilibrium studies and micro-macro 
syntheses” as viable research methods to assess the impact of globalization (2002, 7). 
Aisbett adds to this list the need for “microeconomic studies that test specific 
mechanisms (other than prices) through which globalization is believed to impact the 
poor” (2007, 38). 
Bagwell and Staiger (2002) demonstrate the theoretical basis of lost domestic 
productivity with unbalanced trade. The United States export market, although composed 
of producers in a perfectly competitive market, because of its advanced structure, is 
controlled by a smaller number of agricultural aggregator firms. This forms an 
imperfectly competitive (Cournot) market noted by Bagwell and Staiger (2002, 169), 
Brander (1995), and Helpman and Krugman (1989, 88). It is in this context of free trade 
under the NAFTA trade regime that continued United States domestic subsidies of feed 
grains, especially maize, is said to have subsequently contributed to a reduction in 
welfare in rural Mexico (Burstein, 2007). Although explanation of the effects of free 
trade within an imperfect market may allow for the use of strategic-trade theory espoused 
by Brander and Spencer (1985a, 1), the inclusive hybrid trade theory of Bagwell and 
Staiger provides a more comprehensive and versatile explanation of agricultural disputes 
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(2002, 169). A partial equilibrium model of trade exists in competitive markets. Although 
due to transportation costs feed grains from the United States predominate, this model 
demonstrates that prices in the importing market tend to be lower (Bagwell and Staiger 
2002, 170) than local Mexican production.  
Measurements of well-being and poverty are changing in the 21
st
 century.  
Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi (2009) contend that national income statistics, originally 
intended to measure market economic activity do not adequately measure societal well-
being. They recommend focus on the median of the data used as being more reflective of 
general societal well-being than averages. They also remind us that a significant amount 
of economic activity occurs within the home. These approaches are reflected in Attanasio 
and Szekely’s (2001, 6, 24, 33) discussion of poverty, adding to poverty measurement, 
personal assets, human capital, and redistribution effects. Szekely (2005, 927) and 
Esquivel (2010, 2) add inequality. The Mexican national Social Development policy 
Evaluation National Council (CONEVAL, 2009) data reflect these changing measures. 
Hernandez and Szekely note in their work on poverty alleviation strategies for 
Mexico that limited information hampers use of statistical techniques “to determine the 
significance of the underlying relationships” between poverty and macroeconomic 
variables (2009, 36). They accept that their conclusions are limited and will be verified 
with more complete information and alternate statistical approaches. Each additional 
survey year provides data that improves the validity of findings. They note that, although 
it is necessary to obtain the longest possible time-series data on macroeconomic 
performance and on poverty levels, data is limited for Mexico. Similar to Szekely’s 
(2005) approach this work extends the boundaries of previous research by evaluating the 
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effects of causal variables on multiple definitions of rural Mexican welfare. These 
include measures of Mexican rural poverty from the World Bank, poverty headcount 
ratios from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(SEDLAC), and the Consejo Nacional De Evaluacion de la Politica de Desarrolo Social 
(CONEVAL) estimates of poverty based on the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y 
Geografia (ENIGH) data. 
 Hernandez and Szekely (2009, 37) use time-series poverty estimates constructed 
by Szekely (2005) for the years through 1989 and data from CONEVAL for 1992-2006 . 
Szekely (2005, 913) presents an “historical series of poverty and inequality in Mexico for 
the period 1950-2004,” but also relies on limited years of data collection throughout that 
period, seven surveys that include poverty assessment conducted between 1950 and 1977, 
and beginning in 1984 as the National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics 
(INEGI) began to perform the National Survey of Income and Expenditure (ENIGH) on a 
biannual basis. Szekely (2005, 923) limits his analysis to only 15 points (years) of 
reliable data. Szekely (2005, 919) expands views of poverty from measuring only 
personal and household income to include measuring food poverty, or the inability to 
obtain the basic food basket, measuring capability poverty that includes access to 
medicine and education, and measuring poverty heritage that includes measuring limits 
on access to clothing, housing, and transportation. Szekely (2005, 927) is cautious about 
the robustness of his model predicting poverty and inequality in Mexico, and this due to 
the lack of access to household micro-data, the limited number of observations available 
and the potential effect of unknown variables over five decades. He finds, however, if the 
GINI coefficient is used as a proxy for Mexican population welfare, poverty and 
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inequality are positively correlated from 1950 to 2004. Szekely also finds (2005, 928) 
poverty and inflation are positively correlated over the same period. Szekely maintains 
that inflation affects the poor most as they have less ability to protect their income and 
assets from steady increases in the price level. Szekely (2005, 923) finds that poverty 
declined between 1950 and 1984, remained flat between 1984 and 1994, increased 
through 1996, and then decreased through the balance of the period studied. Szekely 
(2005, 925) finds that inequality followed an inverted U Kuznets curve between 1950 and 
1984, increased from 1984 and then reduced after 2000. CONEVAL also provides details 
of food poverty, capabilities poverty and heritage poverty for both rural and urban 
sectors, but only bi-annually from 1992. Esquivel (2010, 4) describes Mexican phases of 
growth to include social protection, including “non-targeted social programs 
(Solidaridad)” from 1982-1994, targeted programs in rural areas: Progresa and Procampo 
from 1994-2000, and Progresa expanding to urban areas from 2000-2006. 
Hernandez and Szekely (2009, 39, 40) hold that recent poverty estimates are more 
accurate than older estimates. They find that policies that ensure economic growth, 
stabilize the economy and include social spending benefit the poor. Attanasio and 
Szekely (2001, 5) add that more than wages, assets affect poverty. These include personal 
physical capital of financial assets, property, and any other concrete forms of capital that 
can be used in production, and the social capital of interpersonal relationships and 
commitments of and to others within a cultural context. Szekely (2001, 241) describes 
changes in social policies in terms of generations of policies with different focuses and 
intended outcomes. Some have been built on the premise that economic growth enhances 
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the welfare of the poor, but others have been established on the premise that the 
correlation between economic growth and increased welfare for the poor is less clear.  
For this study CONEVAL provides poverty rates for 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 
2000, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008 and 2010. Although CONEVAL collects an 
increasing amount of poverty data, it collects national and state data every two years and 
municipality data every five years as required by the General Law of Social Development 
(CONEVAL 2009). The inadequate amount of Mexican municipal data limits effective 
use of this information for time-series assessment at the municipal level. Other rural 
poverty data such as poverty headcount ratio at the rural poverty line from The World 
Bank and FGT poverty indicators (Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke 1984) from the Socio-
Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC) are used. These 
also are limited to data from 1989 and from even numbered years beginning with 1992. 
Since much of the literature and especially Szekely (2001) and Esquivel (2010) 
note separate economic development phases in Mexico, and each with correspondingly 
different social programs and aid to the rural sector, composite measures of Mexican 
national government support are used. These include Producer Support Estimate (PSE) 
and the General Services Support Estimate (GSSE) and the with the Consumer Support 
Estimate (CSE) noted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and are used to compare to composite effects on rural poverty  
This research assesses the impact of Mexican governmental influence through 
subsidies on rural personal welfare quantified as proxies in three categories of Mexican 
agricultural subsidies and the external economic pressures on rural Mexico exerted by 
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Mexican imports of corn on measures of poverty. Poverty is measured as a percent of the 
population, relative poverty gaps, and poverty and inequality among the rural poor.  
Methodology 
Personal rural welfare in Mexico, as noted by Stiglitz et al. (2009), Szekely 
(2005), and Esquivel (2010), and as prescribed by CONEVAL (2009) is assessed with 
different variables. This research assesses causal impact on sixteen separate measures of 
rural Mexican welfare. Szekely’s choice of these measures is similar to decomposable 
poverty measures (FGT) proposed by Foster et al. (1984) and used by Socio-Economic 
Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC) and the World Bank. Foster et 
al. (1984) measure a simple headcount ratio, FGT0, poverty gap, FGT1, and a measure 
that combines poverty and income inequality among the poor, FGT2.  Twelve years of 
data are clearly identified for the twenty-two year period from 1989 to 2010.  
This research evaluates independent variables using multiple linear regression 
models, each with different measures of Mexican rural welfare (dependent variable) to 
determine the effect of the independent variables on personal rural welfare.  These are 
summarized in Table 10. 
Table 10 
Poverty Indicator Summary 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source Poverty Definition 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
World DataBank, World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Development 
Finance (GDF) 
 
SI.POV.RUHC    Poverty Headcount Ratio at Rural Poverty Line (percent of 
Rural Population) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 10 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Source Poverty Definition 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC) 
Poverty headcount ratios published by Latin American and Caribbean 
governments, and several individual poverty indicators computed following 
SEDLAC methodology, and using two international poverty lines: USD $2.50 
and $4.00 per day at 2005 PPP. The USD $ 2.50 line coincides with the median 
of the extreme poverty lines chosen by the governments of the Latin American 
countries. The USD $ 4.00 line is similar to the median of the official moderate 
poverty lines.  These are shown below. 
 
USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line  
Rural Headcount FGT(0) 
Poverty Gap FGT(1) 
Poverty and Inequality FGT (2) 
 
USD 4 a Day Poverty Line 
Rural Headcount FGT(0) 
Poverty Gap FGT(1) 
Poverty and Inequality FGT (2) 
 
Poverty Lines: 50 percent Median household per capita income 
Rural Headcount FGT(0)  
Poverty Gap FGT(1) 
Poverty and Inequality FGT (2) 
CONEVAL. Estimates of the CONEVAL with basis in the ENIGH from 1992 to 2010: 
Rural Income Poverty by Person: 
"Food poverty: Insufficient income to acquire the basic food basket, even if use 
is made of all the disposable income in the home exclusively for the purchase of 
these goods." (CONEVAL, 2010, under “Glossary”) 
 
"Poverty of capabilities: Inadequate incomes to purchase the food basket and 
carry out the necessary expenditure on health and education, even if use is made 
of all the disposable income in the home exclusively for the purchase of these 
goods and services." (CONEVAL, 2010, under “Glossary”) 
"Poverty of heritage: Inadequacy of the disposable income to purchase the food 
basket and carry out the necessary expenditure on health, education, clothing,  
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 10 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Source Poverty Definition 
________________________________________________________________________ 
housing and transportation, even if use is made of all the disposable income in 
the home exclusively for the purchase of these goods and services." 
(CONEVAL, 2010, under “Glossary”) 
Rural Income Poverty by Household: 
"Food poverty: Insufficient income to acquire the basic food basket, even if use 
is made of all the disposable income in the home exclusively for the purchase of 
these goods." (CONEVAL, 2010, under “Glossary”) 
 
"Poverty of capabilities: Inadequate incomes to purchase the food basket and 
carry out the necessary expenditure on health and education, even if use is made 
of all the disposable income in the home exclusively for the purchase of these 
goods and services." (CONEVAL, 2010, under “Glossary”) 
 
"Poverty of heritage: Inadequacy of the disposable income to purchase the food 
basket and carry out the necessary expenditure on health, education, clothing, 
housing and transportation, even if use is made of all the disposable income in 
the home exclusively for the purchase of these goods and services." 
(CONEVAL, 2010, under “Glossary”) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
The independent variables include four categories of data that may affect welfare. 
These include corn trade imbalances between the United States and Mexico measured as 
the annual tonnage of Mexican imports of corn from the United States, Mexican national 
government subsidies to producers per the Producer Support Estimate (PSE), general 
support of the Mexican agricultural sector per the General Services Support Estimate 
(GSSE), and Mexican consumer subsidies per the Consumer Support Estimate (CSE). 
The government support estimates summarize all forms of Mexican government 
agricultural  support and provide a comprehensive and consistent summary of various aid 
programs implemented through stages of development in the Mexican economy noted by 
Esquivel (2010, 4). Throughout the literature and among data sources, reference to the 
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quantity and significance of private investment in Mexican agricultural production, as 
seen in the ASTI database (Total Agricultural R and D Spending, Agricultural Science 
and Technology Indicators), is amazingly scarce. 
The linear relationships for each of the measures of personal rural welfare are 
shown as: 
Y = B0 + B1x1 + … Bnxtn + Ut 
Such that, PRW = f (UFGT, PS, GS, CS), where PRW reflects sixteen separate measures 
of personal rural welfare in Mexico. UFGT is the tonnage of Mexican imports of corn 
from the United States. This data is from the United States Department of Agriculture, 
Foreign Agricultural Service. PS is Mexican Producer Support Subsidies (PSE), GS is 
Mexican General Services Support Subsidies (GSSE), and CS is Consumer Support 
Subsidies (CSE). These data are from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD).  
Sixteen measures of personal rural welfare (PRW) are separately evaluated as the 
dependent variable in sixteen separate regressions. These separate regression models are 
used to broaden the perspectives of Mexican rural poverty and add to the validity of 
findings of this research over the twenty-two year period in this study. Mexican poverty 
headcount ratio at the rural poverty line, as a percent of the rural Mexican population; 
from the World Bank is one. Nine separate Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (FGT) 
generalized measures of poverty are also evaluated. These are measures of the percent of 
the rural Mexican population and are drawn from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC). Simple rural headcount ratio, FGT0, the average 
rural poverty gap FGT1, and the combined poverty and income inequality among the rural 
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poor, FGT2, are each assessed for three measures of rural poverty. They each include 
USD $2.50 a day rural poverty line (2005 PPP), USD $4.00 a day rural poverty line 
(2005 PPP), and 50 percent median rural household per capita income (2005 PPP). 
Szekely’s (2005, 923) food poverty, capability poverty, and heritage poverty for 
individual rural and household rural income data are also assessed as dependent variables 
to isolate and confirm the effect of the independent variables on personal rural welfare. 
These data are also measures of the percent of the rural Mexican population and are 
drawn from the CONEVAL database. Each of these sixteen measures of personal rural 
welfare is treated as a dependent variable in regressions that span twelve, or in the case of 
CONEVAL data, eleven of the twenty-two years from 1989 to 2010, as shown in Table 
11.  
Table 11 
Poverty Regression Variable Data by Year 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Personal Rural Welfare  1989 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000  
    2002 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Mexican rural poverty (percent of rural population) World Bank: 
   66.5 69.3 80.7 75.9 69.2  
   64.3 57.4 61.8 54.7 60.8 60.8 
USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line SEDLAC: 
Rural Headcount FGT(0)  35.5 39.4 40.6 59.2 55.0 47.1  
     39.3 32.5 30.3 24.9 30.2 27.8 
 
Poverty Gap FGT(1)   14.8 15.2 16.0 28.3 24.9 20.1  
     15.6 13.8 12.1 8.7 11.4 10.9 
Personal Rural Welfare  1989 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000  
    2002 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010 
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________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 11 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Personal Rural Welfare  1989 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000  
    2002 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Poverty and Inequality FGT (2) 8.7 7.9 8.6 17.7 14.6 11.5  
     8.4 7.7 6.7 4.4 6.1 5.9 
 
USD 4 a Day Poverty Line – SEDLAC: 
Rural Head count FGT(0)  59.4 62.0 64.9 78.8 73.9 69.6  
     63.1 54.2 51.8 46.6 51.8 47.9 
 
Poverty Gap FGT(1)   27.4 29.0 30.0 44.0 40.1 34.8  
     29.1 25.1 23.1 19.1 22.6 21.0 
 
Poverty and Inequality FGT (2) 16.6 17.0 17.8 29.6 26.1 21.8  
     17.3 15.2 13.6 10.4 13.0 12.3 
Poverty Lines: 50 percent Median household per capita income – SEDLAC: 
Rural Head count FGT(0)  32.6 44.1 45.7 45.4 51.1 51.2  
     45.6 40.4 39.8 37.5 40.9 35.7 
 
Poverty Gap FGT(1)   13.3 17.3 18.7 20.6 22.7 22.3  
     18.7 17.5 16.5 14.1 16.9 15.0 
 
Poverty and Inequality FGT (2)   7.9   9.1 10.2 12.5 13.1 12.9  
     10.3 10.1   9.4   7.4    9.4   8.4 
CONEVAL:  
Rural food per person    34.0 37.0 53.5 51.7 42.4  
     34.0 28.0 32.3 24.1 31.3 29.3 
Rural capacity per person   44.1 47.5 62.6 59.0 49.9  
     42.6 36.2 39.8 32.2 38.5 37.8 
 
Rural heritage per person   66.5 69.3 80.7 75.9 69.2  
     64.3 57.4 61.8 54.1 60.3 60.8 
 
Personal Rural Welfare  1989 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000  
    2002 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 11 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Personal Rural Welfare  1989 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000  
    2002 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Rural food per Household   28.0 30.1 44.1 43.5 34.1  
     27.8 22.9 26.1 19.1 25.8 23.9 
Rural capacity per Household  36.6 39.4 53.4 50.9 41.3  
     35.4 29.9 32.9 26.0 32.2 31.6 
 
Rural heritage per Household   58.2 61.1 73.1 69.6 60.7  
     56.0 49.3 53.9 46.7 53.1 54.2 
Independent Variables: 
Mexican Political participation (IV) 4.0   4.0   4.0   4.0   3.0   2.0 
 2.5   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.5   2.5 
 
Mexican imports of U.S. Corn (DV) Million Metric Tons 
4856 521 3002 3162 5454  5945  
5288 5885 6336 8768 7841 7488 
 
Producer Support Estimate (PSE) - (MXN million) 
    6421 25689 23737 11712 47511 69918  
             89137 47766 54275 60797 70406 78553  
 
General Services Support Estimate (GSSE) - (MXN million) 
    1733 3411 3956 4111 3818 5941  
    6078 9288 8873 8449 9316 10984  
Consumer Support Estimate (CSE) - (MXN million) 
    (2121) (18884)(11217) 1542(31849)(51199) 
    (68471)(19667)(19088)(19665)(961)(21382) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
The research question is whether and to what extent Mexican corn imports from 
the United States or changes in Mexican agricultural subsidies affect rural Mexican 
poverty? The hypotheses reflect each of these affects. For corn imports into Mexico: 
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Ho:  There is not a measurable increase in poverty in rural Mexico as a result of 
increases in Mexican imports of corn from the United States, especially since the 
implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
H1:  There is a measurable increase in poverty in rural Mexico as a result of 
increases in Mexican imports of corn from the United States, especially since the 
implementation of NAFTA. 
The hypothesis of the Mexican agricultural subsidy effect on rural Mexican 
welfare: 
Ho:  Increases in Mexican agricultural subsidies result in no measurable decreases 
in poverty in rural Mexico, especially since the implementation of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement NAFTA. 
H1:  There is a measureable decrease in poverty in rural Mexico as a result of 
increases in Mexican government agricultural support measured in government support 
estimates, especially since the implementation of NAFTA. 
Findings 
Multiple measures of personal rural welfare, dependent variables, are individually 
regressed on four independent variables: Mexican corn imports from the United States, 
Mexican Producer Support Estimate (PSE) subsidies, Mexican General Services Support 
Estimate (GSSE) subsidies, and Mexican Consumer Support Estimate (CSE) subsidies to 
determine the effect of these causal variables on different measures of rural Mexican 
poverty. The nine regression models using Socio-Economic Database for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (SEDLAC) data are not found acceptable because of low R-squared 
values and poor significance levels of models. The results from this data are inclusive. 
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These multiple linear regression models include the percent of rural population with USD 
2.50 a day rural headcount (FGT0) for the poverty gap (FGT1) and the poverty and 
inequality (FGT2). Those surveyed with somewhat more secure financial standing at USD 
$4.00 per day including FGT0, FGT1, and FGT2, and rural median 50 percent poverty line 
including FGT0, FGT1, and FGT2 also possessed low R-squared values and poor model 
levels of significance and, therefore, are not useful predictive models. 
The model for the Mexican poverty headcount ratio at the rural poverty line to the 
rural population, from World Bank data, provides meaningful predictive power between 
the independent variables and this measure of personal rural welfare. The model 
coefficient of determination, R-squared, is sufficiently robust to assess individual 
independent variables for causality at .620 and .380, respectively.  The R-squared is 
important to this research as it adjusts for an increase in independent variables and for 
limited observations in the model. The model significance, the p value for F, is .1483. Of 
the independent variables regressed on Mexican poverty headcount ratio, only the 
Mexican GSSE provides a meaningful single tail p-value of .073. Its corresponding 
measure of magnitude, coefficient, is -.0027032. This means that for every million pesos 
expended by the Mexican government in general services support estimate (GSSE) 
subsidies the Mexican poverty headcount ratio at the rural poverty line decreases by .27. 
Since the average and median measures of Mexican poverty headcount over the period 
studied are 65.5 and 64.3, respectively, for an additional million pesos expended this 
measure of poverty reduces to 65.21 and 64.03. 
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Table 12 
 
Summary Regression Results by Poverty Indicator 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Poverty Indicators 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Source  --------------- Model ------------------ -------------------------- Variables ------------------------- 
R Square  Adj R Square  Obs.  Sig. F IV Coef p-value1-tail 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Poverty Headcount Ratio at Rural Poverty Line  percent of Rural Population: 
  0.6202    0.3803    11    0.1453   GSSE   -0.0027032    0.136        0.073 
 
USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line - Rural Headcount FGT(0): 
  0.4552    0.1440    12    0.3094  No variables with significant p-values 
 
USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line - Poverty Gap FGT(1): 
  0.3701    0.0101    12    0.4554  No variables with significant p-values 
 
USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line - Poverty and Inequality FGT (2): 
  0.3333    -0.0477    12    0.5243  No variables with significant p-values 
 
USD 4 a Day Poverty Line - Rural Headcount FGT(0): 
  0.5729    0.3288    12    0.4099  No variables with significant p-values 
 
USD 4 a Day Poverty Line - Poverty Gap FGT(1): 
  0.4530    0.1404    12    0.3130  No variables with significant p-values 
 
USD 4 a Day Poverty Line - Poverty and Inequality FGT (2): 
  0.3953    0.0497    12    0.4097  No variables with significant p-values 
 
Poverty Lines: 50 percent Median household per capita income - Rural Headcount 
FGT(0): 
  0.4307    0.1054    12    0.4391  No variables with significant p-values 
 
Poverty Lines: 50 percent Median household per capita income - Poverty Gap FGT(1): 
  0.2980    -0.1078    12    0.5980  No variables with significant p-values 
 
Poverty Lines: 50 percent Median household per capita income - Poverty and Inequality 
FGT (2): 
0.2111    -0.2397    12    0.7583  No variables with significant p-values 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 12 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Poverty Indicators 
Source  --------------- Model ------------------ -------------------------- Variables ------------------------- 
R Square  Adj R Square  Obs.  Sig. F IV Coef p-value1-tail 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Rural income food poverty, by person: 
  0.5610    0.2683    11    0.2270  GSSE    -0.0034829    0.138    0.069 
 
Rural income poverty of capabilities, by person: 
  0.6154    0.3591    11    0.1619  GSSE    -0.003753    0.129    0.0645 
 
Rural income poverty of heritage, by person: 
  0.6256    0.3760    11    0.1510  GSSE    -0.0027038    0.137    0.0682 
 
Rural  income food poverty, by household: 
  0.5583    0.2638    11    0.2306  GSSE    -0.0030267    0.132    0.062 
 
Rural  income poverty of capabilities, by household: 
  0.5961    0.3269    11    0.1837  GSSE    -0.0030664    0.133    0.0665 
 
Rural  income poverty of heritage, by household: 
  0.5958    0.3264    11    0.1840  GSSE    -0.0029123    0.129    0.0645 
________________________________________________________________________ 
The six models in which a proxy for personal rural welfare data, from the 
Mexican National Council for Evaluation of the Social Development Policy 
(CONEVAL), is regressed on the independent variables of Mexican corn imports, PSE, 
GSSE, and CSE provide meaningful predictive power between the independent variables 
and the associated measures of personal rural welfare.  
The percent rural income food poverty by person of the total rural population 
model has a coefficient of determination, R-squared, that is sufficiently robust to assess 
individual independent variables for causality at .561 and .268, respectively.  The model 
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significance is .2270. Of the independent variables regressed on percent rural income 
food poverty by person, only the Mexican GSSE provides a meaningful p-value of .138 
with a single tail value of .069. Its corresponding measure of magnitude, coefficient, is    
-.0034829. This means that for every million pesos expended by the Mexican government 
in general services support estimate (GSSE) subsidies the Mexican percent rural income 
food poverty per person decreases by .34. Since the average and median measures of 
percent rural income poverty by person over the period studied are 36.1 and 34, 
respectively, for an additional million pesos expended this measure of poverty reduces to 
35.80 and 33.62. 
The percent rural income poverty of capabilities by person of the total rural 
population model has a coefficient of determination, R-squared, that is sufficiently robust 
to assess individual independent variables for causality at .615 and .359, respectively.  
The model significance is .1619. Of the independent variables regressed on percent rural 
income poverty of capabilities by person, only the Mexican GSSE provides a meaningful 
p-value of .129 with a single tail value of .065. Its corresponding measure of magnitude, 
coefficient, is -.003753. This means that for every million pesos expended by the 
Mexican government in general services support estimate (GSSE) subsidies the Mexican 
percent rural income poverty of capabilities per person decreases by .38. Since the 
average and median measures of percent rural income poverty of capabilities by person 
over the period studied are 44.6 and 42.6, respectively, for an additional million pesos 
expended this measure of poverty reduces to 44.23 and 42.23. 
The percent rural income poverty of heritage by person of the total rural 
population model has a coefficient of determination, R-squared, that is sufficiently robust 
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to assess individual independent variables for causality at .626 and .376, respectively.  
The model significance is .1510. Of the independent variables regressed on percent rural 
income poverty of heritage by person, only the Mexican GSSE provides a meaningful p-
value of .137 with a single tail value of .068. Its corresponding measure of magnitude, 
coefficient, is -.002704. This means that for every million pesos expended by the 
Mexican government in general services support estimate (GSSE) subsidies the Mexican 
percent rural income poverty of heritage per person decreases by .27. Since the average 
and median measures of percent rural income poverty of heritage by person over the 
period studied are 65.5 and 64.3, respectively, for an additional million pesos expended 
this measure of poverty reduces to 65.23 and 64.03. 
The percent rural income food poverty by household of the total rural population 
model has a coefficient of determination, R-squared, that is sufficiently robust to assess 
individual independent variables for causality at .558 and .264, respectively.  The model 
significance is .2306. Of the independent variables regressed on percent rural income 
food poverty by person, only the Mexican GSSE provides a meaningful p-value of .132 
with a single tail value of .062. Its corresponding measure of magnitude, coefficient, is    
-.0030267. This means that for every million pesos expended by the Mexican government 
in general services support estimate (GSSE) subsidies the Mexican percent rural income 
food poverty per person decreases by .31. Since the average and median measures of 
percent rural income poverty by household over the period studied are 29.6 and 27.8, 
respectively, for an additional million pesos expended this measure of poverty reduces to 
29.3 and 27.5. 
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The percent rural income food poverty by household of the total rural population 
model has a coefficient of determination, R-squared, that is sufficiently robust to assess 
individual independent variables for causality at .596 and .327, respectively.  The model 
significance is .1837. Of the independent variables regressed on percent rural income 
food poverty by person, only the Mexican GSSE provides a meaningful p-value of .133 
with a single tail value of .0665. Its corresponding measure of magnitude, coefficient, is  
-.0030664. This means that for every million pesos expended by the Mexican government 
in general services support estimate (GSSE) subsidies the Mexican percent rural income 
food poverty per person decreases by .31. Since the average and median measures of 
percent rural income poverty by household over the period studied are 37.2 and 35.4, 
respectively, for an additional million pesos expended this measure of poverty reduces to 
36.9 and 35.1. 
The percent rural income poverty of heritage by household of the total rural 
population model has a coefficient of determination, R-squared, that is sufficiently robust 
to assess individual independent variables for causality at .596 and .326, respectively.  
The model significance is .1840. Of the independent variables regressed on percent rural 
income poverty of heritage by person, only the Mexican GSSE provides a meaningful p-
value of .129 with a single tail value of .0645. Its corresponding measure of magnitude, 
coefficient, is -.0029123. This means that for every million pesos expended by the 
Mexican government in general services support estimate (GSSE) subsidies the Mexican 
percent rural income poverty of heritage per person decreases by .29. Since the average 
and median measures of percent rural income poverty of heritage by household over the 
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period studied are 57.8 and 56, respectively, for an additional million pesos expended this 
measure of poverty reduces to 57.51 and 55.71. 
Since the models do not indicate relation between the Mexican corn imports from 
the United States and Mexican rural poverty the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and 
there is no evidence from the data that poverty in rural Mexico is predicted by increases 
of Mexican imports of corn from the United States. This is also true of the producer 
(PSE) and consumer (CSE) Mexican government agricultural subsidies. The null 
hypotheses for these subsidies cannot be rejected.  There is, however, reasonable 
evidence from the World Bank data and all measures of poverty from CONEVAL that 
agricultural infrastructure (GSSE) expenditures predict lower levels of Mexican rural 
poverty.  The null hypotheses for these causal variables are rejected. 
Analysis 
Although rural Mexican welfare is presented in several peer reviewed databases, 
the rural Mexican poverty data has its origin in the Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y 
Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH) or National Household Income and Expenditure 
Surveys. Though rural poverty data is collected biannually the ENIGH surveys are the 
best and closest to the source of the data we have for measures of rural Mexican welfare. 
Szekely (2005) underscores that though some of this data has been collected under the 
auspices of various Mexican government agencies since 1950, more recent data 
collection under the direction of the National Institute of Statistics and Geography 
(INEGI) is both more consistent from year to year and more reliable. 
Findings indicate that measures of Mexican rural headcount ratio, noted by the 
World Bank, and Mexican rural income percentages, noted by CONEVAL, are predicted 
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by the causal variables used in these models, whereas the measures associated by the 
rural poverty lines, noted by SEDLAC, are not. A significant portion of the variation in 
the measures of rural poverty, the dependent variables from the World Bank and 
CONEVAL is predicted by the independent variables in these models. 
Table 13 
 
Model Level Regression Summary 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Source/   Adj 
 Model R Square  R Square Obs.   Sig. F 
________________________________________________________________________ 
World Bank: 
1. Poverty Headcount Ratio 0.6202  0.3803 11 0.1453 
CONEVAL: 
2. Rural income food poverty by person  0.5610 0.2683 11 0.2270 
3. Rural income poverty of capability by person 0.6154 0.3591 11 0.1619 
4. Rural income poverty of heritage by person 0.6256 0.3760 11 0.1510 
5. Rural income food poverty by household  0.5583 0.2638 11 0.2306 
6. Rural income poverty of capability by household  0.5961 0.3269 11 0.1837 
7. Rural income poverty of heritage by household  0.5958 0.3264 11 0.1840 
________________________________________________________________________ 
When adjusted for the limited number of observations, R-squared, these models 
predict from 26 to 38 percent of the variation in the various measures of rural Mexican 
poverty. In all of these seven models the General Services Support Estimate (GSSE) is 
found to have significance above 90 percent. Mexican imports of corn from the United 
States and other subsidy measures (PSE and CSE) do not. The GSSE one-tail p-values 
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fall between .0620 and .0730. The GSSE also have negative coefficients, indicating that 
as the Mexican GSSE increases, rural Mexican poverty levels decrease. Among these 
seven models the effect size of these coefficients ranges from .27 to .34, indicating that 
for every million pesos invested in the GSSE the corresponding Mexican rural poverty 
percent decreases by those amounts. Although the weakness of the models exists due to 
observational limitations resulting in relatively less robust predictability at the model 
level, these coefficients are significant. All seven of these models indicate that for every 
three million pesos additionally invested by the Mexican government in GSSE, the 
survey estimates of rural Mexican poverty decrease by approximately one percent.  
Durbin-Watson test of the model reveals Durbin-Watson Statistic D values for the 
independent variables with significant p-values between the lower critical value DL and 
the upper critical value DU, indicating inability to determine positive autocorrelation of 
this data set with the Durbin-Watson test.  
Table 14 
 
Durbin-Watson Statistic Values 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Model, IV       k    n      D          DW table used    DL      DU 
________________________________________________________________________ 
PRW01, GSSE    5    11    0.460234              5%               0.315    2.645 
PRW11, GSSE    5    11    0.489823              5%               0.315    2.645 
PRW12, GSSE    5    11    0.421903              5%               0.315    2.645 
PRW13, GSSE    5    11    0.459180              5%               0.315    2.645 
PRW14, GSSE    5    11    0.482034              5%                0.315    2.645 
PRW15, GSSE    5    11    0.406122              5%                0.315    2.645 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 14 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Model, IV       k    n      D          DW table used    DL      DU 
________________________________________________________________________ 
PRW16, GSSE    5    11    0.422259              5%                0.315    2.645 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Time series plot summaries or trend graphs for these data show significant trends 
in the data throughout the period studied. Mexican imports of maize dramatically 
increased through the period from 521 Million Metric Tons (MMT) in 1992 to 7,480 
MMT in 2010, a thirteen-fold increase. The Mexican Producer Support Estimate (PSE) 
and the Mexican General Services Support Estimate (GSSE) significantly increased 
through the period, while the Mexican Consumer Support Estimate (CSE) remained flat. 
The PSE increased from 25.688 billion pesos in 1992 to 78.552 billion pesos in 2010, a 
two-fold increase, and the GSSE increased from 3.410 billion pesos in 1992 to 10.983 
billion pesos in 2010, also a two-fold increase throughout the period. The CSE from 1992 
to 2010 increased at a much slower rate from -18.844 billion pesos to -21.382 billion 
pesos. It is important to note that CSE expenditures are defined as negative expenditures. 
All of the causal variables examined dropped measurably during the 1995 peso crisis in 
Mexico.  
 
 
Figure 8. Mexican imports of United States corn in Million Metric Tons. 
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Figure 9. Producer Support Estimate (PSE)-(MXN million). 
 
 
 
Figure 10. General Services Support Estimate (GSSE)-(MXN million). 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Consumer Support Estimate (CSE)-(MXN million). 
 
It is also significant that all measures of Mexican rural poverty trended down over 
the twenty-two year period, but all measures of Mexican rural poverty increased 
measurably during the 1995 Mexican peso crisis.  Since these values measure population 
poverty rates, real rural income is implied over the period studied. Mexican rural poverty 
trends of significant models of poverty trends are shown in Figures 12 through 18.  
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Mexican rural poverty trends of less significant models also show similar patterns of 
decreasing poverty and are included in Figures 19 through 27. 
 
 
Figure 12. Significant models: Mexican rural poverty percent of rural population-World 
Bank. 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Significant models: Mexican percent personal food-evolution of income 
poverty-CONEVAL. 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Significant models: Mexican percent personal capacity-evolution of income 
poverty-CONEVAL. 
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Figure 15. Significant models: Mexican percent personal heritage-evolution of income 
poverty-CONEVAL. 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Significant models: Mexican percent homes-food evolution of income 
poverty-CONEVAL. 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Significant models: Mexican percent homes-capacity evolution of income 
poverty-CONEVAL. 
 
66.5 69.3 80.7 75.9 69.2 64.3 57.4 61.8 54.1 60.3 60.8 
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010
PRW:  Mexican Percent  Personal 
Heritage - Evolution of income 
poverty - CONEVAL 
PRW:  Mexican Percent  Personal Heritage - Evolution of income poverty
- CONEVAL
28.0 30.1 44.1 43.5 34.1 27.8 22.9 26.1 19.1 25.8 23.9 
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010
PRW:  Mexican Percent Homes /Food 
Evolution of income poverty - 
CONEVAL 
PRW:  Mexican Percent Homes /Food Evolution of income poverty -
CONEVAL
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Figure 18. Significant models: Mexican percent homes-heritage evolution of income 
poverty-CONEVAL. 
 
 
 
Figure 19.  Mexican rural poverty trends of less significant models; Mexican percent 
rural headcount FGT(0) USD $2.50 per day poverty line percent of rural population-
SEDLAC. 
 
 
 
Figure 20.  Mexican rural poverty trends of less significant models; percent 
Mexican rural poverty gap FGT(1), USD $2.50 per day poverty line-SEDLAC. 
 
58.2 61.1 73.1 69.6 60.7 56.0 49.3 53.9 46.7 53.1 54.2 
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010
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Figure 21.  Mexican rural poverty trends of less significant models; Mexican percent 
poverty and inequality FGT(2), USD $2.50 per day poverty line-SEDLAC. 
 
 
 
Figure 22.  Mexican rural poverty trends of less significant models; Mexican 
percent rural head count FGT(0), USD $4.00 per day poverty line-SEDLAC. 
 
 
 
Figure 23.  Mexican rural poverty trends of less significant models; Mexican percent 
poverty gap FGT(1), USD $4.00 per day poverty line-SEDLAC. 
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Figure 24.  Mexican rural poverty trends of less significant models; Mexican percent 
poverty and inequality FGT (2), USD $4.00 per day poverty line-SEDLAC. 
 
 
 
Figure 25.  Mexican rural poverty trends of less significant models; Mexican percent 
rural head count FGT (0), poverty lines: 50 percent median household per capita income-
SEDLAC. 
 
 
 
Figure 26.  Mexican rural poverty trends of less significant models; Mexican percent 
poverty gap FGT (1), poverty lines: 50 percent median household per capita income-
SEDLAC. 
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Figure 27.  Mexican rural poverty trends of less significant models; Mexican percent 
poverty and inequality FGT (2), poverty lines: 50 percent median household per capita 
income-SEDLAC. 
 
These findings are consistent with what Szekely (2005, 923) finds about poverty 
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increasing through 1996, and then decreasing. Szekely (2001, 241) also describes 
changes in social policies as generations of policies with different focuses and intended 
outcomes. The changes in macroeconomic conditions for Mexico such as the 1994-96 
peso crisis and what Esquivel (2010, 4) describes as Mexican changes in the delivery of 
social protection may have a more significant impact on the personal welfare of the 
Mexican rural poor than corn imports from the United States or the composite amounts of 
Mexican government agricultural subsidies for producers (PSE) and consumers (CSE). 
Conclusions 
This research looks inside the Mexican economy to evaluate the Mexican rural 
welfare at a national, composite level. The findings of this study indicate despite these 
overall trends, Mexican General Services Support Estimate (GSSE) possesses a 
significant and measurable inverse relationship to rural Mexican poverty measured at 
most levels. Other potentially causal variables are not shown to affect the measured rural 
Mexican poverty levels. Mexican producer and consumer agricultural subsidies and 
7.9 9.1 10.2 12.5 13.1 12.9 10.3 10.1 9.4 7.4 9.4 8.4 
1989 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010
PRW:  Mexican Percent Poverty and 
Inequality FGT (2) Poverty Lines: 50% 
Median household per capita income … 
PRW:  Mexican Percent Poverty and Inequality FGT (2) Poverty Lines:
50% Median household per capita income - SEDLAC
 90 
 
Mexican corn imports do not show a causal link to rural Mexican poverty. The balance of 
available data does not conclude that as imports of corn from the United States 
(unbalanced trade) increase that any segment of the rural Mexican population is worse 
off. 
This study also underscores the need for more time-series data to advise public 
policy. Researchers such as Szekely (2005) in an effort to assess poverty have sought 
variations in data, but the need for additional, consistently surveyed, reliable time-series 
data will in all likelihood only be met with time and consistent commitment to population 
surveys. Time series data is essential to understanding historical trends and, as Hernandez 
and Szekely (2009) note, limited annual data restricts viable explanation of Mexican rural 
poverty. More data over longer timeframes will contribute to stronger models and 
increase our understanding of fundamental causes of Mexican rural poverty. Until then, 
alternate approaches to discern causality must be used. Szekely’s (2005) approach to drill 
deeper within existing variables and Foster et al. (1984) FGT measures of poverty to sub-
divide variables available and will allow some measure of consistency of observations to 
assess the personal welfare of the rural Mexican poor. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RURAL MEXICAN RESPONSES TO LOST AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT:  
MIGRATION AND OTHER SURVIVAL MECHANISMS 
Introduction 
As Allee et al. (1949, 539) point out, “an organism has but three choices available 
when exposed to adversity: it may die, adjust, or migrate. Hibernation and aestivation are 
broad adjustments to adverse weather or climate. Migration is another way to avoid 
unfavorable conditions.” From the earliest formal research of human migration, 
Ravenstein (1885) demonstrates the importance of financial incentives of migration 
among people groups. This chapter posits that rural Mexican population responds to lost 
employment opportunities by emigrating to locations of opportunity such as large 
Mexican cities and to the United States. 
Review of the Literature 
Theoretical Background 
Allee et al. (1949) point out that  
migration . . . has become divided into at least three categories: . . . a more or less 
continuous and direct movement . . . from one locality to another, in which there 
is a periodic return to the original locality; . . . a movement of a portion of a 
species population, often over great distances, to another locality, without a return 
to the original area; and . . . remigration, a movement of a portion of a species 
population from one locality to another, with a return movement to the original 
locality. (529) 
 
As Allee et al. (1949) note it is not just poor survival environment, but 
comparatively less desirable environments that incentivize beings to migrate. “In Mexico, 
the rural wage increased from 28 percent of the urban wage in 1992 to 40 percent in 
2002” (World Bank 2007, 216). Papademetriou (2008) notes the implementation of 
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NAFTA led to a movement of labor that neither Mexico nor the United States was 
prepared to address. Kuznets (1955, 8) in a theoretical review of income inequality builds 
on the premise that urban industrial sectors have higher per capita productivity than 
agriculture and subsequently higher incomes. He posits that rural emigration occurs 
among lower-income levels (Kuznets 1955, 9) and that the dynamic of the hope of 
personal and family improvement is a significant economic incentive for personal change 
(Kuznets 1955, 10, 24). Theoretically the earnings inequality between agriculture and 
urban sectors widens over time (Kuznets 1955, 12-18). The process of economic growth 
has “shattering effects” on an existing economic infrastructure, first widening inequality, 
then narrowing it (Kuznets 1955, 18). During the phase of widening income inequality a 
minimal middle class exists (Kuznets 1955, 20-21), and so pathways to personal-familial 
economic improvement are limited. Kuznets warns against prescribing growth paths of 
developed countries with “completely free markets, lack of penalties implicit in 
progressive taxation, and the like are indispensable for . . . economic growth” to 
developing countries (Kuznets 1955, 26). Kuznets concludes his discussion of income 
inequality with the caution that distribution is a focal point of a functioning economic 
system and that populations are aware of that distribution, noting that societies are 
acutely aware and are interested in that distribution (Kuznets 1955, 27). The United 
States Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic 
Development (USCSIMCED) report to the United States Congress (1990) noted that the 
main motivation for Mexican migration to the United States is economic. Black, 
Kolesnikova, and Taylor remind us that, although theorists “in labor supply studies [tend] 
to ignore prices other than wages,” prices of relevant consumption goods must be 
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included with wages in evaluating labor supply decisions (2009, 613). Hanson (2003, 15) 
documents the scope of Mexican rural-to-urban migration. Population in cities with more 
than 500,000 inhabitants rose by four to five percent, and towns with less than 2,500 fell 
by three to four percent between 1990 and 2000. Bhagwati (2004, 55) posits that an 
economy can grow and paradoxically “immiserize” a country and its poor, unless 
developmental policies are concurrently implemented. Bhagwati uses the term 
“immiserize” to describe how an economy and the welfare of a people can become worse 
off even though it has “grown through accumulating capital or improving productivity” 
Bhagwati (2004, 55).  Public policies and growth paths can affect the poor differently and 
so must address the unintended effects of growth policies (Bhagwati 2004, 56). 
History and Pressures to Migrate 
Mexican migration to the United States dates from the mid-nineteenth century, 
driven by the economic growth and territorial expansion of the United States (Delgado-
Wise and Covarrubias 2007, 664). The United States’ Bracero Program (1942-1964) 
coordinated Mexican guest workers, especially from rural central western Mexico 
(Fussell 2004, 938).  
Delgado-Wise and Covarrubias (2007) note that the integration of the Mexican 
economy with the United States results in significant Mexican emigration and resultant 
asymmetries between the two countries in “employment insecurity, poverty, and social 
marginalization” (2007, 656). They contend that the classical migration model of Harris 
and Todaro (1970) does not consider the costs of migration, risk assessment, relative 
deprivation, or the role of social capital in decisions to migrate.  
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Motivations to migrate vary. They are enhanced by financial market failures in 
the migrant’s home country. Less skilled workers tend to rely on rural-based social 
networks for migration assistance, while those with greater human capital tend to use 
them less and some even enter the United States in search of “adventure” (Fussell 2004, 
940). Familial decisions in Mexico to financially support emigration are often made as 
investments with expectations to receive return through remittances. Reynoso, Villarreal, 
and Gomez (2009) note that certain sending family sizes, wealth, expectations and needs 
tend to positively affect these remittances and include home ownership and even family 
ownership of a truck. Reynoso et al. (2009) also note that those with greater preparation, 
skill and educational attainment, tend to migrate to areas of increased opportunity, and 
there is an inverse relationship between the migrant’s education and funds remitted to the 
family.  Both Stecklov, Winters, Stampini, and Davis (2005) and Hanson (2006) note that 
increases in educational attainment are associated with increased migration, but less so 
among college graduates. Hanson (2006) also notes that though increased education is 
associated with migration to the United States, the inverse is true for work related skills.  
Less skilled Mexicans tend to migrate to the United States at a higher rate than those with 
more developed skills. The geographic origin of emigration is changing from western 
Mexico to the interior urban communities (Fussell 2004, 962).  
Delgado-Wise and Covarrubias (2007) conclude that migration is a complex 
process and effective government policy must involve developing different ways to 
integrate regionally, reducing asymmetries and promoting alternative Mexican 
development models. Fitzgerald (2006) sees Mexican emigration restrictions 
implemented in a bureaucratic division of multiple conflicting governing bodies in 
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Mexico. Incentives to migrate are so strong that families arrange for long separations 
(Frank and Wildsmith 2005, 920). Krissman (2005) maintains that migration networks 
seldom originate individual hometowns, that migration from individual locales is not self-
perpetuating, but that labor recruiting creates and perpetuates migratory flows. Mishra 
(2007) empirically investigates the demand for labor as emigration occurs from Mexico 
and finds a strong and positive impact of the outflow of workers on wages in Mexico. 
Mishra finds that as emigration occurs, the more educated who remain benefit 
substantially more than the less educated from the increased labor demand in Mexico that 
results from the decreased domestic labor supply in the sending country.  
A long term, culturally based emigration structure has developed in Mexico. 
Boehm (2008, 780) finds that migration decisions almost always center on children, and 
that “the multiple migration decisions parents face . . . are directly linked to the well-
being of family members, particularly the youngest.” “The words ‘for my children’ have 
become a trope linking migration to the next generation” (Boehm 2008, 786). VanWey 
(2005) finds that land ownership affects migration rates as a store of wealth, a source of 
employment, an investment, and as a device of ownership, and that subsequent migration 
responses vary. 
Migration Experience 
Sana (2008, 995) attributes migrant remittances to the growth in the migration 
rate referring to it as the “migration effect.” Sana also correlates migration and 
subsequent remittance rates to the economic growth of the receiving country. Novoa and 
Sanabria (2008) find that migrants view national borders as a transnational area, and not 
as a thin line dividing one country from another. Migrant flows respond to expansion of 
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emerging markets and shrink as employment demand lessens. Cassarino (2004, 275) 
concludes that migrant return is “influenced by the initial motivations for migration” and 
conditions and duration of stay. Whether one holds to neo-classical international 
migration theory, as in Todaro (1969, 140), that migration choice is permanent or to the 
new economic labor migration theory, as articulated by Cassarino (2004), that return 
from a migratory experience is part of the initial migration strategy, the influences of 
initial choices of the migrant to relocate are significant. 
Theoretical Framework 
Kuznets’ (1955, 1971) theory of economic growth and income inequality explains 
the dynamic shown in this study that lower personal welfare provides incentives for the 
rural Mexican population to emigrate to locations of opportunity, specifically to the 
United States to seek work and higher wages. Hanson (2003) shows the changing 
population demographics of smaller Mexican towns and larger cities. Allee et al. (1949) 
and Ravenstein (1885) indicate that there are often common forces that induce migration, 
but for Mexico there is a disproportionately higher percentage of emigration of rural 
residents migrating to the United States than those from urban or suburban Mexico. 
Papademetriou (2008) and Ravenstein (1885) note economic incentives as important 
motivators to migrate. Bhagwati (2004) and Todaro (1969) note that internal economic 
policies often result in lower personal welfare, which adds to economic incentives to 
emigrate. VanWey (2005) outlines forms of wealth other than wages that contribute to or 
inhibit emigration. Mathews (2007) notes that common cultural values impact the 
selection of destinations within a receiving country. Aguilera-Guzman et al. (2004) 
demonstrate the effect of these common cultural values in destinations in the United 
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States. Fussell (2004) and Krissman (2005) address the importance of receiving countries 
enforced immigration policies on decisions to migrate. Fitzgerald (2006) provides a 
complementary perspective from the sending country policies that contribute to strength 
of the receiving country’s immigration policies. Delgado-Wise and Covarrubias (2007), 
Black, Kolesnikova, and Taylor (2009), and Novoa and Sanabria (2008) outline 
immigrant concerns as they enter a new country, and Aguilera-Guzman et al. (2004) , and 
Frank and Wildsmith (2005) specifically address uncertainties in immigration that 
underscore those concerns. 
Methodogy 
The propensity to migrate to locations of opportunity, especially to large urban 
centers in Mexico and to the United States is affected by several variables. To determine 
the strength and likelihood, a regression model is developed on these variables evaluated 
from the 1980 to present. Hernandez and Szekely (2009, 36) note that lack of data 
“impede the use of solid statistical techniques to determine the significance of the 
underlying relationships.” This is especially true for national Mexican rural poverty data, 
which for the most part is limited to 1984, 1989, and to more thorough surveys conducted 
biannually from 1992 to the present. Hernandez and Szekely (2009, 37) address the 
necessity to “obtain the longest possible time-series data on macroeconomic performance 
and on poverty levels,” but time-series detail is less available for Mexico. This analysis 
regresses net Mexican migration on the independent variables of personal rural welfare in 
Mexico, defined as personal wealth and employment, financial opportunity in the United 
States, the strength of common cultures in destination locations that may include the 
existence of common religious populations and personal, culturally-based relationships, 
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favorable receiving country policies, and ease of relocation including out of pocket costs 
and uncertainty. This is shown as: 
Y = B0 + B1x1 + … Bnxtn + Ut 
Such that, M = f (PRW, FO, CV, GP, RE), where M is the net migration of Mexican 
citizens to the United States, and PRW are measures of the personal rural welfare in 
Mexico. FO is the financial opportunity in the United States measured in the median 
income of Hispanics in the United States. CV is composite cultural values and is 
measured as a proxy, the average number of personal Chicano relationships of Mexican 
immigrants in the United States. GP is a measure of immigrant policies in the receiving 
country and is measured as a proxy, the average number of deportations experienced by 
heads of household from Mexico on a first migration attempt. RE is a measure of the ease 
of relocation including financial costs, and uncertainty is measured as a proxy, the 
average Hispanic unemployment rate in the United States. This is a summary proxy that 
approximates costs that can include the costs of coyotes, family separation, and perils 
from organized crime in the transnational area.  
Net migration of Mexican citizens to the United States (M) data is from the 
United States Census Bureau and measures net migration between the two countries from 
1980 to present. Personal rural welfare (PRW) is accounted for using eighteen separate 
measures of well-being. Fifteen are from data for the years 1984, 1989, and biannually 
from 1992 to 2010. Three separate measures are from 1980 to 2010. These data are 
gathered from the World Bank, the Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe 
or Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), and the Socio-
Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC). These official 
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database sources are based on data gathered by the Mexican Encuesta Nacional de 
Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares or National Survey on Household Income and 
Expenditures (ENIGH).  
Measures of personal rural welfare include Mexican rural poverty as a percent of 
the rural population, and the calculated rural/urban poverty ratio sources from the World 
Bank, the Mexican rural population in poverty and extreme poverty percentages, and the 
Mexican rural household in poverty and extreme poverty percentages from CEPAL. They 
include measures of population and households in poverty and extreme poverty, the total 
Mexican unemployment rate, the rural to total Mexican unemployment ratio, and the 
rural to total Mexican ratio of unemployment. Nine Foster et al. (FGT) poverty indicators 
(Foster et al. 1984) from SEDLAC provide additional rural poverty measurements. These 
include Mexican rural headcount (FGT0) at USD $2.50/day and USD $4.00/day, Mexican 
rural poverty gap (FGT1) at USD $2.50/day and USD $4.00/day, and poverty and 
inequality measures (FGT2) at USD $2.50/day and USD $4.00/day, as well as the 50 
percent median household per capita income for Mexican rural headcount (FGT0), 
Mexican rural poverty gap (FGT1), and poverty and inequality (FGT2). The total rural 
unemployment percentage, rural to total unemployment ratio, and the population 
employed in the rural sector are derived from CEPAL-STAT database. These last three 
provide data from 1980 to 2010 and so provide more robust modeling.  
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Table 15 
 
Mexican Rural Welfare Indicators 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Source Data 
________________________________________________________________________ 
World DataBank  World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Development 
Finance (GDF) 
WDI/GDF Poverty Headcount Ratio at Rural Poverty Line ( percent of Rural 
Population) 
Calculated  Rural to Urban Poverty Ratio (Rural  percent / Urban  percent) 
Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe;  
         Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) 
CEPAL  Mexican Rural Population in Poverty percent 
CEPAL  Mexican Rural Population in Extreme Poverty percent 
CEPAL  Mexican Rural Households in Poverty percent 
CEPAL  Mexican Rural Households in Extreme Poverty percent 
Calculated  Total Mexican Unemployment Rate   G= [ e/(c+e) ] 
CEPAL  Total Employed Work Force [c] 
CEPAL  Total Unemployed Work Force [e] 
Calculated  Rural/Total Unemployment Ratio H=[ f/(d+f) ] 
CEPAL  Employed Rural Work Force [d] 
CEPAL  Total Unemployed Rural Work Force [f] 
Calculated  Mexican Population Employment Rural/total Sector   (H /G) 
 
Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC) 
Rural Headcount FGT(0)  USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line 
Poverty Gap FGT(1)  USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 15 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Source Data 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Poverty and Inequality FGT(2) USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line 
Rural Headcount FGT(0)  USD 4 a Day Poverty Line 
Poverty Gap FGT(1)  USD 4 a Day Poverty Line 
Poverty and Inequality FGT(2) USD 4 a Day Poverty Line 
Rural Headcount FGT(0) Poverty Lines: 50 percent Median household per 
capita income 
Poverty Gap FGT(1) Poverty Lines: 50 percent Median household per 
capita income 
Poverty and Inequality FGT(2) Poverty Lines: 50 percent Median household per 
capita income 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Personal Rural Welfare Data (PRW) for these rural Mexican poverty measures is 
shown in the following tables.  World Bank data and CEPAL data are shown in Table 16, 
containing personal rural welfare indicators PRW01 – PRW06, CEPAL and SEDLAC 
data are shown in Table 17, PRW07 – PRW12; and SEDLAC data are shown in Table 
18, PRW13 – PRW18. 
Table 16 
 
World Bank and CEPAL Mexican Rural Welfare Data: PRW01 – PRW06 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Year PRW01 PRW02 PRW03 PRW04 PRW05 PRW06 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1980       
1981       
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 16 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Year PRW01 PRW02 PRW03 PRW04 PRW05 PRW06 
________________________________________________________________________
1982       
1983       
1984   53.5 25.4 45.0 19.7 
1985       
1986       
1987       
1988       
1989   56.7 27.9 48.3 22.4 
1990       
1991       
1992 66.5 1.50 54.9 25.7 46.4 19.9 
1993       
1994 69.3 1.68 56.5 27.5 46.5 20.4 
1995       
1996 80.7 1.31 62.8 33.0 53.4 25.0 
1997       
1998 75.9 1.36 58.5 31.1 49.3 23.5 
1999       
2000 69.2 1.58 54.7 28.5 60.7 34.1 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 16 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Year PRW01 PRW02 PRW03 PRW04 PRW05 PRW06 
________________________________________________________________________ 
2001       
2002 64.3 1.56 51.2 21.9 56.0 27.8 
2003       
2004 57.4 1.40 44.1 19.3 49.3 22.9 
2005 61.8 1.61 47.5 21.7 53.9 26.1 
2006 54.7 1.52 40.1 16.1 47.2 19.5 
2007       
2008 60.8 1.50 44.6 19.8 53.6 26.3 
2009       
2010 60.8 1.34 42.9 21.3   
2011       
________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 17 
 
CEPAL and SEDLAC Mexican Rural Welfare Data: PRW06 – PRW12 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Year PRW07 PRW08 PRW09 PRW10 PRW11 PRW12 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1980 7.8% 19.5%   2.51    
1981 8.5% 20.0%   2.35    
1982 9.2% 20.4%   2.21    
1983 9.9% 20.8%   2.10    
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 17 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Year PRW07 PRW08 PRW09 PRW10 PRW11 PRW12 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1984 10.6% 21.2%   2.00    
1985 11.3% 21.6%   1.92    
1986 11.8% 21.7%   1.84    
1987 12.3% 21.9%   1.78    
1988 12.9% 22.1%   1.71    
1989 13.4% 22.2%   1.66 35.5 14.8 8.7 
1990  ...   ...   ...     
1991  ...   ...   ...     
1992  ...   ...   ...  39.4 15.2 7.9 
1993 2.4% 0.3%   0.13    
1994  ...   ...   ...  40.6 16.0 8.6 
1995 4.7% 0.9%   0.20    
1996 3.7% 0.6%   0.15 59.2 28.3 17.7 
1997 2.6% 0.5%   0.20    
1998 2.3% 0.3%   0.13 55.0 24.9 14.6 
1999 1.7% 0.3%   0.19    
2000 1.6% 0.3%   0.20 47.1 20.1 11.5 
2001 1.7% 0.3%   0.18    
2002 5.2% 0.3%   0.06 39.3 15.6 8.4 
2003 5.5% 0.3%   0.06    
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 17 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Year PRW07 PRW08 PRW09 PRW10 PRW11 PRW12 
________________________________________________________________________ 
2004 6.5% 0.3%   0.05 32.5 13.8 7.7 
2005 4.5% 0.4%   0.08 30.3 12.1 6.7 
2006 3.6% 0.4%   0.11 24.9 8.7 4.4 
2007 3.7% 0.4%   0.10    
2008 4.0% 0.4%   0.10 30.2 11.4 6.1 
2009 5.5% 0.4%   0.07    
2010 7.9% 0.4%   0.05 27.8 10.9 5.9 
2011       
________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 18 
 
SEDLAC Mexican Rural Welfare Data: PRW13 – PRW18 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Year PRW13 PRW14 PRW15 PRW16 PRW17 PRW18 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1982       
1983       
1984       
1985       
1986       
1987       
1988       
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 18 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Year PRW13 PRW14 PRW15 PRW16 PRW17 PRW18 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1989 59.4 27.4 16.6 32.6 13.3 7.9 
1990       
1991       
1992 62.0 29.0 17.0 44.1 17.3 9.1 
1993       
1994 64.9 30.0 17.8 45.7 18.7 10.2 
1995       
1996 78.8 44.0 29.6 45.4 20.6 12.5 
1997       
1998 73.9 40.1 26.1 51.1 22.7 13.1 
1999       
2000 69.6 34.8 21.8 51.2 22.3 12.9 
2001       
2002 63.1 29.1 17.3 45.6 18.7 10.3 
2003       
2004 54.2 25.1 15.2 40.4 17.5 10.1 
2005 51.8 23.1 13.6 39.8 16.5 9.4 
2006 46.6 19.1 10.4 37.5 14.1 7.4 
2007       
2008 51.8 22.6 13.0 40.9 16.9 9.4 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 18 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Year PRW13 PRW14 PRW15 PRW16 PRW17 PRW18 
________________________________________________________________________ 
2009       
2010 47.9 21.0 12.3 35.7 15.0 8.4 
2011       
________________________________________________________________________ 
Non-poverty variables are measured in each model.  Financial opportunity (FO) is 
measured as the median income (in constant 2009 dollars) of Hispanics in the United 
States. This data is drawn from the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. Strength of common cultures (CV) is measured as the average number of 
personal Chicano relationships of Mexican immigrants in the United States, drawn from 
the Office of Population Research at Princeton University (OPR). The summary of 
government policy of the receiving country (GP) uses as a proxy, the number of 
deportations during the first crossing from Mexico to the United States of heads of 
households, and is drawn from the Office of Population Research at Princeton University 
(OPR). The Office of Population Research collects information on multiple crossings of 
individuals entering the United States from Mexico, demonstrating a pattern of return 
migration. Since the first crossing is assumed to be seminal for an individual in a dual 
country residency, the first crossing is considered the most important. The average 
Hispanic unemployment rate in the United States is used as a proxy for ease of relocation 
(RE) and is drawn from the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. The criteria for these data selections are based on the availability of data over 
the years assessed, uniqueness of the data that is avoiding multicollinearity, and 
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relatedness of the data to rural Mexico. This study includes the dependent variable, net 
migration from Mexico (M), as well as the non-poverty independent variables personal 
relationships (CV), average head-of-household deportation rate at first border crossing 
into the United States (GP), and the unemployment rate of Hispanic immigrants in the 
United States.  Data are summarized in Table 19. 
Table 19 
 
Regression Data of Migration Rates and Non-poverty Measures 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Year Net Migration  Personal Hispanic Avg HofH Immigrant 
 from Mexico  Relationships  Deportations Unemployment 
 to the U.S. in the U.S. First Crossing in the U.S. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1980 -245,000 0.457  0.40  10.1 
1981 -228,000 0.442  0.89  10.4 
1982 -156,000 0.349  0.79  13.8 
1983 -159,000 0.343  0.69  13.7 
1984 -218,000 0.452  0.89  10.7 
1985 -262,000 0.399  0.84  10.6 
1986 -268,000 0.403  0.57  10.6 
1987 -275,000 0.431  0.33  8.8 
1988 -332,000 0.469  0.40  8.1 
1989 -432,000 0.409  0.32  8 
1990 -408,000 0.451  0.22  8.2 
1991 -374,000 0.467  0.51  10 
1992 -309,000 0.352  0.32  11.6 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 19 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Year Net Migration  Personal Hispanic Avg HofH Immigrant 
 from Mexico  Relationships  Deportations Unemployment 
 to the U.S. in the U.S. First Crossing in the US 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1993 -341,000 0.369  0.40  10.7 
1994 -396,000 0.458  0.38  9.9 
1995 -415,000 0.349  0.44  9.3 
1996 -415,000 0.272  0.46  8.9 
1997 -415,000 0.225  0.44  7.7 
1998 -508,000 0.209  0.60  7.2 
1999 -651,000 0.225  0.30  6.5 
2000 -424,000 0.234  0.63  5.7 
2001 -590,000 0.282  0.24  6.6 
2002 -564,000 0.287  0.24  7.6 
2003 -537,000 0.217  0.64  7.7 
2004 -511,000 0.284  0.78  7.0 
2005 -485,000 0.383  0.35  6.0 
2006 -464,000 0.512  0.60  5.2 
2007 -443,000 0.227  0.60  5.7 
2008 -422,000 0.375  0.60  7.7 
2009 -401,000 0.120  -    12.1 
2010 -380,000 0.333  -    12.5 
2011 -368,000  -    -    11.5 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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The research question is whether changes in personal rural welfare, financial 
opportunity in the United States, the draw of cultural value sharing in the receiving 
country, the general policy and effectiveness of the receiving country’s migration law, or 
cost of relocation affect net Mexican migration. The breadth of this question begins to 
unwrap whether and to what extent decreased welfare and lost employment in rural 
Mexico, of which agriculture is a significant portion, results in measurable emigration of 
the rural Mexican population to locations of economic opportunity especially to the 
United States. 
Ho:  Lost rural welfare in Mexico does not cause measurable increases in net 
Mexican migration to the United States. 
H1:  Lost rural welfare in Mexico results in measurable increases in net Mexican 
migration to the United States. 
Has financial opportunity specifically in United States affected net Mexican 
migration? 
Ho:  Financial opportunity in the United States does not cause measurable 
increases in net Mexican migration to the United States. 
H1:  Financial opportunity in the United States results in measurable increases in 
net Mexican migration to the United States. 
Does cultural value sharing available to Mexican immigrants in the United States, 
as seen in the number of Hispanic relationships of immigrants, positively affect net 
migration? 
Ho:  Shared cultural values in relationships available to Mexican immigrants in 
the United States do not result in measurable increases in net Mexican migration to the 
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United States. 
H1:  Shared cultural values in relationships available to Mexican immigrants in 
the United States result in measurable increases in net Mexican migration to the United 
States. 
Have increases in United States restrictive immigration policies reduced net rural 
Mexican migration? 
Ho:  Increases in United States restrictive immigration policies do not result in 
decreased net rural Mexican migration to the United States. 
H1:  Increases in United States restrictive immigration policies result in decreased 
net rural Mexican migration to the United States. 
Have increased costs of relocation to United States negatively affected net rural 
Mexican migration? 
Ho:  Increased costs of relocation to United States do not result in measurable 
decrease net Mexican migration to the United States. 
H1:  Increased costs of relocation to United States result in measurable decreased 
rural Mexican migration to the United States. 
Findings 
Eighteen regression models are evaluated to measure effect on net Mexican 
migration of measures of rural Mexican poverty, financial opportunity in the United 
States, common values in the form of culturally based relationships found by Mexicans in 
the United States, migration policy-driven activities of the United States government, and 
of measures of ease of relocation in the United States. 
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The regression analysis model using Mexican rural poverty percentage of the 
rural population from the World Bank provides low adjusted R-square scores and model 
significance and is, thus ignored. This is also true of the model using the calculated 
rural/urban poverty ratio from the World Bank and the nine models using the Foster, 
Greer, Thorbecke (FGT) poverty indicator regressions using data provided by SEDLAC 
and so all are dismissed from consideration. 
Table 20 
 
Regression Summary by Mexican Rural Welfare Indicators 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Source -------------------------------- Model ----------------------------------- ------------------------- Variables ---------------------- 
R Square Adj R  Square Obs. Sig. F IV Coef p-value 1-tail 
________________________________________________________________________ 
World DataBank, World Development Indicators 
WDI/GDF Poverty Headcount Ratio at Rural Poverty Line  
  0.5507 0.0109 10 0.5221 none 
Calculated Rural to Urban Poverty Ratio (Rural  percent / Urban  percent) 
  0.5302 0.0570 10 0.5549 none 
Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe; 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) 
Percent Mexican Rural Population in Poverty 
  0.7504 0.5425 12 0.074 
    CV  456,897  0.2050 0.1025 
 GP  187,880  0.1530 0.0765 
 RE    33,370  0.1370 0.0685 
Percent Mexican rural Population in Extreme Poverty 
  0.7704 0.5791 12 0.0599 
   CV  512,809  0.1260 0.0630 
       GP  181,058  0.1110 0.0555 
       RE  36,725  0.1010 0.0505 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 20 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Source -------------------------------- Model ----------------------------------- ------------------------- Variables ---------------------- 
R Square Adj R  Square Obs. Sig. F IV Coef p-value 1-tail 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Percent Mexican Rural Households in Poverty 
  0.8287 0.6859 12 0.0269 
     PRW  10,197  0.1220 0.0610 
       CV  580,899  0.0410 0.0205 
       GP  208,308  0.0500 0.0250 
       RE  36,583  0.0530 0.0265 
Percent Mexican Rural Households in Extreme Poverty 
  0.8493 0.7237 12 0.0188 
     PRW  11,980  0.0780 0.0390 
       CV  618,370  0.0270 0.0135 
       GP  200,754  0.0410 0.0205 
       RE  38,844  0.0360 0.0180 
Calculated Total Mexican Unemployment Rate   G= [ e/(c+e) ] 
  0.8478 0.8098 26 0.0000 
     FO  (3.77450) 0.1340 0.0670 
       CV  469,828  0.0090 0.0045 
       GP  155,365  0.0250 0.0125 
       RE  24,841  0.0080 0.0040 
Calculated Rural to Total Unemployment Ratio   H=[ f/(d+f) ] 
  0.8538 0.8173 26 0.0000 
     CV  397,173  0.0250 0.0125 
       GP  140,635  0.0400 0.0200 
       RE  24,435  0.0070 0.0035 
Calculated Mexican Rural to Total Employment Ratio (H /G) 
  0.8581 0.8226 26 0.0000 
     CV  369,750  0.0340 0.0170 
       GP  126,400  0.0690 0.0345 
       RE  24,183  0.0070 0.0035 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 20 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Source -------------------------------- Model ----------------------------------- ----------------------- Variables ---------------------- 
R Square Adj R  Square Obs. Sig. F IV Coef p-value 1-tail 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC) 
 
Rural Headcount FGT(0) - USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line 
  0.5301 0.0602 11 0.4490 none 
Poverty Gap FGT(1) - USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line 
  0.5243 0.0487 11 0.4587 none 
Poverty and Inequality FGT (2) - USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line 
  0.5241 0.0482 11 0.4591 none 
Rural Headcount FGT(0) - USD 4 a Day Poverty Line 
  0.5287 0.0574 11 0.4513 none 
Poverty Gap FGT(1) - USD 4 a Day Poverty Line 
  0.5289 0.0577 11 0.4511 none 
Poverty and Inequality FGT (2) - USD 4 a Day Poverty Line 
  0.5269 0.0537 11 0.4545 none 
Rural Headcount FGT(0) - Poverty Lines: 50 percent Median household per capita 
income 
  0.5321 0.0641 11 0.4457 none 
Poverty Gap FGT(1) - Poverty Lines: 50 percent Median household per capita income 
  0.5310  0.0620 11 0.4475 none 
 
Poverty and Inequality FGT (2) - Poverty Lines: 50 percent Median household per capita 
income 
 0.5355 0.0709 11 0.4399 none 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Seven regression models provided acceptable adjusted R-square results and model 
significance. These reflect personal rural welfare in Mexico measuring poverty and 
unemployment from the Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe or 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL). In each model 
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increases in the number of Hispanic relationships in the United States, a proxy of 
common value sharing (CV); increases in the number of deportations of head-of-
household on first migration attempt, a proxy for active enforcement of government 
migration policy (GP); and increases in Hispanic unemployment in the United States, a 
proxy for all of the costs of relocation (RE), result in reduced migration.  
Of these seven, four directly reported measures of personal rural welfare from 
CEPAL possess minimal data points needed for a robust regression model and 
demonstrate Durbin-Watson tests that show positive serial correlation of the predictor 
variables. There is, therefore, no useable evidence that the independent variables of those 
four models predict migration from Mexico to the United States.  These are percent 
Mexican rural population in poverty, percent Mexican rural population in extreme 
poverty, percent Mexican rural households in poverty, and percent rural households in 
extreme poverty.  Three models, however, possess an acceptable number of data points, 
26, and are not shown by the Durbin-Watson test to exhibit positive serial correlation of 
predictor variables.  These are total Mexican unemployment rate, Mexican rural to total 
unemployment ratio, and Mexican rural to total employment ratio. 
Table 21 
 
Durbin-Watson Statistic Values 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Model, IV k n D DW table used p-value DL DU 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Percent Mexican Rural Population in Poverty 
CV 6 12 0.1878743 5% .0125 .268 2.832 
GP 6 12 0.1878743 5% .0765 .268 2.832 
RE 6 12 0.1878743 5% .0685 .268 2.832 
D is below dL.  There is evidence of positive autocorrelation among residuals. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 21 (continued). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Model, IV k n D DW table used p-value DL DU 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Percent Mexican Rural Population in Extreme Poverty 
CV 6 12 0.1878743 5% .0630 .268 2.832 
GP 6 12 0.1878743 5% .0555 .268 2.832 
RE 6 12 0.1878743 5% .0505 .268 2.832 
D is below dL.  There is evidence of positive autocorrelation among residuals. 
Percent Mexican Rural Households in Poverty 
PRW 6 12 0.1878743 5% .0610 .268 2.832 
CV 6 12 0.1878743 5% .0205 .268 2.832 
GP 6 12 0.1878743 5% .0250 .268 2.832 
RE 6 12 0.1878743 5% .0565 .268 2.832 
D is below dL.  There is evidence of positive autocorrelation among residuals. 
Percent Mexican Rural Households in Extreme Poverty 
PRW 6 12 0.1878743 5% .0390 .268 2.832 
CV 6 12 0.1878743 5% .0135 .268 2.832 
GP 6 12 0.1878743 5% .0205 .268 2.832 
RE 6 12 0.1878743 5% .0180 .268 2.832 
D is below dL.  There is evidence of positive autocorrelation among residuals. 
Total Mexican Unemployment Rate 
FO 6 26 2.151977 5% .0670 .897 1.992 
CV 6 26 2.151977 1% .0045 .711 1.759 
GP 6 26 2.151977 5% .0125 .897 1.992 
RE 6 26 2.151977 1% .0040 .711 1.759 
D is below dL.  There is no evidence of positive autocorrelation among residuals. 
Mexican Rural to Total Unemployment Ratio 
CV 6 26 2.123034 5% .0125 .897 1.992 
GP 6 26 2.123034 5% .0200 .897 1.992 
RE 6 26 2.123034 1% .0035 .711 1.759 
D is below dL.  There is no evidence of positive autocorrelation among residuals. 
Mexican Rural to Total Employment Ratio 
CV 6 26 2.121035 5% .0170 .897 1.992 
GP 6 26 2.121035 5% .0345 .897 1.992 
RE 6 26 2.121035 1% .0035 .711 1.759 
D is below dL.  There is no evidence of positive autocorrelation among residuals. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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The net Mexican migration rate to United States averages 387,375 persons 
annually from 1980 to 2011. In the three remaining models using CEPAL measures of 
poverty for rural Mexican welfare, increases in the Hispanic unemployment rate in the 
United States (RE) by one percent results in a 6.3 percent decrease of the annual 
migration rate (24,486 persons). In these models an increase by one in the average 
deportations of the head-of-household per year on first attempt at migration (GP) results 
in a decrease in annual migration of 36.3 percent (140,800 persons). In these models an 
increase of one in the few number of meaningful Hispanic relationships (CV) in the 
United States as tracked by the Office of Population Research (OPR) results in a decrease 
in the migration rate of 106 percent (412,250 persons). Financial opportunity (FO) is 
statistically significant in one model that includes total Mexican unemployment rate as a 
measure of personal rural welfare, but the coefficient is very small (3.8) and so is 
dismissed from consideration.  
The model that uses the total Mexican unemployment rate calculated from 
CEPAL as a measure of rural welfare has R-Square values of .8478 and .8098 and a 
model significance of .0000. The coefficient for financial opportunity in the United States 
(FO) is -3.7745 with a one-tail, p-value of.0670. Although statistically valid, the small 
size of the coefficient, -3.7745, means the effect is insignificant. The coefficient for 
common cultural sharing (CV) is 469,828 with a one-tail, p-value of.0045. The 
coefficient is 1.213 more than the average net Mexican migration rate and so an increase 
of one in the average number of Hispanic relationships in the United States will result in 
an annual decrease in migration of approximately 469,828 persons. The number of 
deportations of head-of-household on first migration attempt (GP) in this model has a 
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coefficient of 155,365 and a one-tail, p-value of.0125, meaning that as the number of 
these deportations, which average .51 from 1980 to 2011, increase by one the annual 
migration rate is cut by 40.1 percent. The Hispanic unemployment rate in the United 
States, a measure of ease of relocation (RE) in this model, has a coefficient of 24,841 and 
a one-tail, p-value of.0040, meaning that as the average Hispanic unemployment rate in 
the United States, which averages 9.07 from 1980 to 2011, increases by one percent the 
migration rate is reduced by 6.4 percent, or 24,841 persons. 
The model that uses the rural to total Mexican unemployment ratio calculated 
from CEPAL as a measure of rural welfare has R-Square values of .8538 and .8173 and a 
model significance of .0000. The coefficient for common cultural sharing (CV) is 
397,173 with a one-tail, p-value of .0125. The coefficient is 1.025 more than the average 
net Mexican migration rate, so an increase of one in the average number of Hispanic 
relationships in the United States will result in an annual decrease in migration of 
approximately 397,173 persons. The number of deportations of head of household on first 
migration attempt (GP) in this model has a coefficient of 140,635 and a one-tail, p-value 
of.0200, meaning that as the number of these deportations, which average .51 from 1980 
to 2011, increase by one the annual migration rate is cut by 36.3 percent. The Hispanic 
unemployment rate in the United States, a measure of ease of relocation (RE) in this 
model, has a coefficient of 24,435 and a one-tail, p-value of.0035, meaning that as the 
average unemployment rate in the United States, which averages 9.07 from 1980 to 2011, 
increases by one percent the migration rate is reduced by 6.3 percent, or 24,435 persons. 
The model that uses the rural to total Mexican employment as a ratio calculated 
from CEPAL as a measure of rural welfare has R-Square values of .8581 and .8226 and a 
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model significance of .0000. The coefficient for common cultural sharing (CV) is 
369,750 with a one-tail, p-value of.0170. The coefficient is 95.5 of the average net 
Mexican migration rate and so an increase of one in the average number of Hispanic 
relationships in the United States will result in an annual decrease in migration of 
approximately 369,750 persons. The number of deportations of head of household on first 
migration attempt (GP) in this model has a coefficient of 126,400 and a one-tail, p-value 
of.0345, meaning that as the number of these deportations, which average .51 from 1980 
to 2011, increase by one the annual migration rate is cut by 32.6 percent. The Hispanic 
unemployment rate in the United States, a measure of ease of relocation (RE) in this 
model, has a coefficient of 24,183 and a one-tail, p-value of.0035, meaning that as the 
average unemployment rate in the United States, which averages 9.07 from 1980 to 2011, 
increases by one percent the migration rate is reduced by 6.2 percent, or 24,183 persons. 
Lost rural welfare in Mexico demonstrates no increases in net Mexican migration, 
and in two models there is a modest decrease in migration due to lower rural welfare. 
This null hypothesis is rejected. Only one of the models shows statistical significance of 
the effect of financial opportunity in the United States increasing migration. This null 
hypothesis is rejected, but findings possess such a small coefficient as to make 
conclusions of little value. The models demonstrated a lessening of migration as the 
result of increases in shared cultural values in relationships available to Mexican 
immigrants in the United States. Although expected change (H1) is to increase migration, 
the coefficient indicates that as cultural values increase migration decreases. This null 
hypothesis is rejected. Increases in the enforcement of restrictive United States 
immigration policies and increases in costs of relocation measured in increased Hispanic 
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unemployment in the United States have statistical and measurable effect on decreasing 
net Mexican migration to the United States. These null hypotheses are rejected. 
Analysis 
Analysis of eighteen models, each with separate measures of personal rural 
welfare in Mexico show that only three provide viable predictions of net Mexican 
migration to the United States. Four provide meaningful significance values, but are 
shown to possess significant serial correlation among the predictor variables.  Eleven 
regression analyses provide poor fit and are ignored. These regression models include the 
Mexican rural poverty headcount percentage of the rural population and the calculated 
rural/urban poverty ratio from the World Bank, and the nine Foster, Greer, Thorbecke 
(FGT) poverty indicator models from SEDLAC. 
Three regression models show statistical significance for the independent 
variables. In each of these models the percent of Hispanics unemployed in the United 
States, the average number of deportations of heads of households on first border 
crossing into the United States and the number of personal friends from Mexico an 
immigrant has in the United States show inverse relationship to the net Mexican 
migration rate. None of the regression models show significant p-values without serial 
correlation for measures of personal rural welfare. 
 These models show that with probabilities at 95 percent that for every percent 
that Hispanic unemployment in the United States increases the net Mexican migration 
into the United States decreases by approximately 24,486 persons. The average net 
Mexican migration rate of 387,375 from 1980 to 2011 is assumed (United States 
Department of Commerce, United States Census Bureau, 2012) this is a decrease of 6.3 
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percent. This conclusion is expected from migration theory presented by Kuznets (1955, 
1971), Papademetriou (2008) and Ravenstein (1885).  Non-diaspora migration is most 
often driven by financial incentives. 
These models also show with probabilities at or above 95 percent, as the average 
number of deportations of heads of household on first border crossing into the United 
States increases by one the net migration from Mexico into the United States decreases 
by 40,800 per year or 3.3 percent. These findings are consistent with Fitzgerald (2006), 
Delgado-Wise, Kolesnikova, and Taylor (2007), Novoa and Sanabria (2008), and Frank 
and Wildsmith (2005) that a receiving country’s immigration policies and uncertainties of 
immigration affect migrant patterns. 
Surprisingly, these models also show with probabilities near or above 95 percent 
that as the number of personal Chicano relationships in the United States increase by one, 
net migration from Mexico into the United States decreases from, 412,250 per year or 
106 percent. This is counter-intuitive to findings of Aguilera-Guzman et al. (2004) who 
show the importance of common cultural values in the destination locations in the United 
States. The coefficients for this causal variable are so strong as to predict a pattern of 
reverse migration. This implies that, although interpersonal relationships are important to 
immigrants, they provide an inverse incentive to further migration or provide an incentive 
for return migration paths. 
Financial opportunity is statistically significant in one model: total Mexican 
unemployment rate. The causal variable, financial opportunity, is measured as the median 
income of Hispanics in the United States on an annual basis.  This significance could be 
partially the result of crowding out by other Latinos as that population segment grows 
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and Hispanic labor niches experience adequate labor supply and driving down wages.  
The coefficient is very small, so it is dismissed from consideration. The relationships 
shown here may be most reflective of the impact of the independent variables on the rural 
Mexican family. Although lacking strong probability, these findings indicate a tendency 
for family members of the very poor to not migrate. This may be due to the need for 
immediate family members to remain at home or might indicate that at these levels of 
poverty physical or monetary capacity to migrate do not exist. 
Conclusions 
Available United States census data indicates that a large number of Mexican 
immigrants self-report rural roots (Burstein 2007), but financial capital and physical 
ability may be more influential in migration and these assets may be the result of 
intermediate migration steps, such as migration to larger Mexican communities and then 
to the United States. 
It is expected that in the last two decades as the employment opportunity 
decreases and poverty increases in rural Mexico there is a corresponding increase in 
emigration from rural Mexico directly to locations of opportunity in the United States. 
This is not the case from observed data. Financial opportunity and decreased personal 
welfare confirm migration incentives, but available data does not show a link between 
rural Mexican poverty and net Mexican migration to the United States. Finally, increases 
in cultural relationships in the United States, United States deportation rates, and 
Hispanic unemployment in the United States significantly lower net Mexican migration 
rates. 
More survey data of rural Mexico is needed. Although Mexican poverty data is 
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available, most measures of rural poverty data in Mexico is limited, consisting of 1989 
and biannual data from 1992. Secondary indicators of rural well-being are also scarce. 
Consistent with Hernandez and Szekely (2009) and Székely’s (2005) recommendations, 
more time-series data is needed for more robust rural poverty assessment in Mexico, and 
these more robust models will confirm currently observed trends and migration 
incentives.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
The inclusion of Mexico into the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) forming a trilateral trade bloc composed of the United States, Canada, and 
Mexico on January 1, 1994 caused concern within each of the member countries.  These 
concerns ranged from loss of rights to fairness to questions of effectiveness of free trade. 
Baghwati (2004) clearly outlines the benefits of free trade, but Stiglitz and Charlton 
(2005) caution about population segments that lose as free trade is implemented.  
There is concern that the heavily subsidized domestic corn production leads to 
unfair trade advantages with Mexico in agriculture.  The subsequent concern is that as 
low cost yellow corn is sold into Mexico large portions of the Mexican agriculture sector 
are displaced and experience increases in poverty.  Lastly, there is concern that as income 
decreases in the Mexican rural sector that population is incentivized to migrate to 
locations of opportunity in larger Mexican cities and to the United States.  
Research findings show from 1986 to 2007, as the United States/Mexico ratios of 
fertilizer, farm equipment, and general governmental support (GSSE) of agriculture 
increase, exports of corn to Mexico increase. Total production ratios, land production 
efficiency ratios, personal subsidy to the individual farmer (PSE) ratios, and consumer 
subsidy (CSE) ratios between the two countries do not predict increases in exports of 
corn from the United States to Mexico.  Research findings also show that increases in 
rural poverty in Mexico are predicted by changes in the general governmental support 
(GSSE) of agriculture ratio between the United States to Mexico.  Increases in imported 
corn from the United States, personal subsidy to the individual farmer (PSE) ratios, and 
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consumer subsidy (CSE) ratios between the two countries do not predict increases in 
rural poverty in Mexico.  Research findings show migration from Mexico to the United 
States is not affected by personal rural welfare, but is negatively affected by Hispanic 
unemployment in the United States, the number of deportations of heads of household on 
first immigration attempt, and the number of personal Hispanic friends in the United 
States while in the country. 
In summary, this research shows that a domestic corn subsidy to United States 
farmers does not affect corn exports to Mexico.  Increases in exports of corn to Mexico 
from the United States do not predict an increase in Mexican rural poverty, and levels of 
rural Mexican poverty from 1980 to 2010 are not seen to affect Mexican migration to the 
United States. 
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